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I.  MAJOR ISSUES IN THE FORMATION OF NAFTA
Negotiations for the formation of a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) are
occurring in a time of dynamic change.  The Canada-United States Trade Agreement (CUSTA),
signed in 1988, is in the early stages of implementation.  Mexico is in the process of fundamental
economic reforms which follow closely on the heels of the trade policy reform that came with
Mexican accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986, in turn a part
of the wrenching adjustments to a debt crisis in the early 1980s.  Furthermore, a major agreement
under the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations is in the process of finalization which could have
significant effects for all three nations in North America.  Analysis of any potential consequences
of NAFTA for agriculture must be considered in this dynamic context.  
The economies of the three countries are highly interdependent.  The degree of
interdependence is, however, asymmetric with Canada and Mexico much more dependent on the
United States than is the reverse case.  Figure 1 shows that 75% of Canadian exports and 88% of
Mexican exports are destined for the U.S.  On the other hand, only 22% of U.S. exports are
shipped northward into Canada and 7% southward to Mexico.  Although any agreement is likely
to focus on commodity and merchandise trade flows, close integration of capital, labor, and input
markets means that a broader set of issues is inextricably intertwined in the agreement.  Flows of
capital and investment, particularly into Mexico, are a central concern.  Implications for labor
migration, both legal and illegal, are clearly important.  Impacts on wage rates, social service
costs, interest rates, exchange rates, employment, and economic growth rates could be significant. 
Issues of environmental regulations, health and safety standards, and regulation of industry require
attention.  All of these issues set the context within which explicit consideration of impacts on the
composition and magnitude of likely changes in trade flows, the location of production and
processing, and the general competitive position of national industries are to be determined. 
Finally, a myriad of legal issues concerned with dispute settlement mechanisms, rules on
investment and ownership, and of compensation for adjustment will of necessity accompany any
agreement.
When we consider the agricultural implications of a NAFTA, a more specific set of
issues arise.  Market access for Mexican goods into the U.S. and Canada, together with access
into the Mexican market, will be the primary focus of attention.  But underlying these access
issues are domestic policies of the participants.  All three countries intervene heavily in their
agricultural sectors.  Policies include border protection that limits market access, price supports to
domestic producers, consumer and marketing distortions, and the provision of export assistance. 
Clearly each of these will require some adjustments under a NAFTA.  However, specifics of these
changes will be influenced by any possible GATT agreement.  Issues relating to labor demand,
migration, and agricultural wage rates are also central.  Major concerns with food safety, healthand sanitary restrictions, and the environmental consequences of changing patterns of production,
processing and consumption, will need attention.  These and other issues will set the policy
context within which adjustments in food and agriculture occur.
Of major concern to agricultural interests in all three countries will be the impact of the
agreement on industrial competitiveness.  Changes in competitiveness will affect trade flows
which in turn will alter the structure and geographic distribution of the North American food
industry.  Will the agreement alter the location of agricultural production and processing?  Will
industries move from one country to another?  Will new competitive conditions give differential
incentives for technical innovation, leading to changes in scale economies and altered locations of
production?  Will the larger market lead to a smaller number of players through mergers, buyouts
and bankruptcy, or to greater competition?  Which countries and which interest groups will
benefit and which will lose?  If one looks only at proposed or possible changes in border
measures--tariffs, quotas, and technical restrictions--it is impossible to gain a full understanding of
the consequences of NAFTA or to allay the fears of those who perceive themselves as potential
losers.  Therefore the broader context must always be kept in mind.
In the sections that follow, the paper addresses a subset of issues of concern to the
agricultural industries of the three countries.  Each issue is considered in the context of the
broader issues just outlined.
II.  AGRICULTURAL ISSUES IN THE NAFTA NEGOTIATIONS
1. The Scope of the Negotiations on Agriculture
Agriculture will have a key role to play in any agreement on freer trade among Mexico,
Canada, and the U.S.  Mexico will be seeking easier access for its farm goods to the U.S. and
Canadian markets and, in turn, will be pressed to open further its own markets to products from
the U.S. and Canada.  In addition to the traditional focus on the removal of direct trade barriers,
the NAFTA negotiations will have to recognize the wide range of domestic policies in the farm
sector that distort trade.  Strong interests will argue for and against liberalization in agricultural
markets.  A multitude of reasons will be advanced to justify special treatment for agricultural
trade.  Moreover, agricultural issues overlap with those of environmental conditions and
employment prospects--the two major focal points for the political debate on NAFTA in the U.S. 
For these reasons the agricultural negotiations will be difficult and controversial.  In turn,
significant progress in the agricultural talks will be important for the conclusion of a meaningful
overall agreement.  Negotiators will have to keep firmly in mind the objective of the talks: to
create a larger economically integrated market in North America.
One factor in particular will add complexity to the agricultural component of the NAFTA
talks: the state of parallel discussions in the Uruguay Round on new rules to govern agricultural
trade in the GATT.  Many of the objectives of freer North American trade in agricultural products
would be assisted by a speedy resolution of the GATT talks.  Yet, if the U.S., Canada, and(QT C ECWVKQPCT[ VCNG CDQWV UGVVKPI GZRGEVCVKQPU VQQ JKIJ KP VJKU EQPVGZV￿ UGG 4QDGTV .￿ 2CCTNDGTI ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
Mexico proceed in advance of a firm GATT pact, the possibility of exploring regional solutions to
some of the issues on the GATT agenda remains.
Underlying both the NAFTA and the GATT negotiations is a further set of discussions of
an internal nature which will be shaping domestic policies.  The process, which has become
known as "agricultural policy reform," is at one level more fundamental than the trade talks.  This
is most apparent in Mexico, where the role of the state in agricultural markets is being reassessed,
and the related issues of rural incomes, farm structure, and food security are under intensive
review.  Mexico is clearly viewing the NAFTA talks as providing the backdrop for such domestic
changes, but the issues would be faced regardless of the GATT or NAFTA discussions.  The U.S.
and Canada (along with most industrial countries) are also in the process of reviewing their
domestic agricultural policies, though for different reasons and with varying degrees of urgency. 
In the U.S., the continuing need for budget stringency has led to an agreement on major
reductions in spending on domestic farm programs for the next few years.  In Canada, the impetus
arises from the anomalous restrictive market agreements for agricultural produce, mainly at a
provincial level, increasingly out of line with the mainstream of federal economic policy, a desire
to restructure domestic policies to make them more "green" in a trade sense, and a tightening
budget constraint.
 Domestic agricultural policies are not formally "on the table," but in agriculture the
distinction between trade and domestic policy is always blurred.  Many of the issues of
agricultural trade stem from the existence of complex domestic policies in that sector.  Explicit
trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, are often minor impediments to trade compared to other
"non-tariff" measures and to the operation of a multitude of government regulations.  The tough
question for negotiators becomes one of how deep to delve into the domestic arena of social,
technical, sectoral, developmental and environmental policies in pursuit of those that impede trade
and transnational investment.  In practice, this will be limited in part by the time available to
negotiate the agreement.
2. Sectoral perspectives on NAFTA
Decisions on the general direction of trade policy are presumably taken at a reasonably
high level in any administration.  The politics of the negotiations, however, quickly moves away
from the consideration of overall national trade strategy.  The debate becomes a contest among
different sectors which feel their economic interests to be at stake.  This often results in
exaggerated claims and counterclaims in attempts to catch the public attention.  In reality, one
would not expect dramatic changes in trade flows, employment, or sectoral incomes to arise from
a NAFTA.   The overall importance of the negotiation of an agricultural component to NAFTA
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lies more in its impact on the long run development of agriculture on the North American
continent.  Many other factors will have a greater impact on farm sectors in the short and medium
run.  These factors include technical change within all elements of the food chain, weather and
disease problems, national macroeconomic conditions, agricultural price policies, world market
trends, environmental and water use policies, and shifts in consumer tastes.  Trade policy toward6JG OCTMGV HQT RTQEGUUGF VQOCVQGU KU QPG QHVGP OGPVKQPGF CU HCEKPI KPETGCUKPI EQORGVKVKQP HTQO /GZKEQ￿
￿
6QOCVQGU CTG QPG QH VJG OQUV KORQTVCPV CITKEWNVWTCN GZRQTVU QH /GZKEQ￿ 6JG KPFWUVT[￿U HWVWTG KP /GZKEQ KU￿
JQYGXGT￿ C HWPEVKQP QH KPETGCUGF HQTGKIP KPXGUVOGPV￿ 6JWU VJG EQORGVKVKQP CTKUGU NCTIGN[ HTQO VJG TGNCZCVKQP QH
/GZKECP TGUVTKEVKQPU QP HQTGKIP KPXGUVOGPV￿ CNVJQWIJ KV OKIJV DG OCFG OQTG KPVGPUG D[ GCUKGT CEEGUU VQ VJG 7￿5￿
OCTMGV￿
2TQFWEGTU QH UWEJ UWEEGUUHWN GZRQTV KVGOU CU CNOQPFU CU YGNN CU VJQUG RTQFWEKPI UVQPG HTWKVU VGPF VQ UGG OCTMGV
￿
QRRQTVWPKVKGU KP VJG 0#(6#￿
Mexico and Canada would come far down the list of concerns for the average U.S. farmer.  Only
when trade policy constrains one of these other factors is it likely to have a significant impact on
average farm incomes.
The debate on the agricultural implications of a NAFTA has thus far concentrated on
issues of market access, labor costs, and production regulations.  U.S. farmers, in common with
other businessmen, view a NAFTA largely in terms of the impact on their own markets.  This has
led to widely differing reactions from different sectors of agriculture and different regions of the
country.  Among those who look for expanded export sales are grain and oilseed producers who
view the present policies in Mexico as inimical to imports.  This means that "mainstream" U.S.
agriculture, and the organizations that represent it, tend to be in favor of an agreement.  By
contrast, producers of fruits and vegetables whose products compete with imports from Mexico,
in particular those in Florida, are likely to resist any moves to lower protection from seasonal
tariffs.   Somewhere in between are farm interests in California and other Western states.  Many
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producers are already geared towards overseas markets, and tend to see benefits in freer trade and
investment.   Those who have begun already to think of a single agricultural market in North
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America see opportunities for more specialization, such as concentration on the fresh rather than
the processed fruit and vegetable market.
In addition to some concerns about increased competition from Mexico, there are many
producers in the U.S. (and Canada) who are worried about the increased potential for introducing
plant diseases not now present in their regions.  Some producers claim that their Mexican
competitors presently get an unfair cost advantage from the use of plant protection materials
banned in the U.S. as well as from other more lax environmental standards.  Other producers are
concerned to ensure that freer trade does not inadvertently bring with it plant and animal disease
problems from over the border, problems which are now dealt with by import bans and plant and
animal health-related import regulations. From the Mexican perspective, these health regulations
are often seen as a masked non-tariff trade barrier intended to protect domestic producers from
competition and not from disease.
The impact of NAFTA on farm labor markets is a topic of particular interest to U.S. farms
in the southwest.  This raises the ongoing process of integration of the North American market. 
Agriculture does not in general exhibit the same degree of tension as in the manufacturing sectors
between labor and management (or shareholders) with respect to the location of production
facilities.  Farmers can in effect move their operations offshore by leasing land in other countries
and more and more farmers are making use of this option as foreign investment regulations are
relaxed in Mexico.6JG FGVGTOKPCPVU QH OKITCVKQP KPVQ VJG 75 CTG FKUEWUUGF KP 9C[PG #￿ %QTPGNKWU CPF 2JKNKR .￿ /CTVKP ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
(QT C FKUEWUUKQP QH VJG KUUWG QH TWTCN NCDQT CPF OCK\G RTKEGU UGG ,￿ ’FYCTF 6C[NQT ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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This leads to considerable flexibility in farming systems and locations.  For those who do
not wish to move their farming operations, one alternative has always been the importation of
labor.  Hence, there is much interest in the question of NAFTA's impact on farm labor markets. 
More jobs for farmworkers in the agricultural export sector in Mexico, and the possibility of
higher industrial wages in that country, could translate into higher wage costs in agriculture in
California, New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, Oregon and Washington.  On the other hand there is
already evidence of new migration patterns taking place, as workers from Southern Mexico and
from Central America begin to move in to take the place of Mexican farm workers in the U.S.
4
  
Mexican agriculture faces the opposite set of problems to those anticipated by U.S.
farmers.  The export sectors will expect to get better access to the U.S. market for fruits and
vegetables, for sugar and cotton, and for livestock.  Export sectors in Mexico will try to resist the
imposition of tougher environmental laws, which they will see as denying them a competitive
advantage.  U.S. sanitary and phytosanitary regulations which at present keep some produce out
of the market, such as the ban on avocados in force in California, will be challenged.  But the
most significant impact may come in the market for import commodities, where Mexican grain
farmers, in particular, will face increased competition.  These farmers are concerned with the
prospect of lower prices, especially for such staples as white corn and dry beans, that would come
from any liberalization of imports.  At present such imports are controlled by a public agency,
CONASUPO, that administers domestic price policy.  Any relaxation of these arrangements will
face strong political opposition.
The impact of these changes on the labor market within Mexico could be profound.  The
small-farm sector in Mexico has few alternative crops.  The corn (maize) price influences the
allocation of labor in rural Mexico, as well as the flow of corn from the rural to the urban areas.   
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Reducing grain protection raises a complex set of problems and possibilities for the Mexican
farmworkers.  Mexican workers who would otherwise move to the U.S. to look for work could
gain jobs in Mexico in an expanded fruit and vegetable export sector.  But the supply of workers
seeking employment in Mexican agriculture could also increase if demand for their services
faltered in the U.S. as a result of the decline in fruit and vegetable production in border states. 
The first change would increase their wages, and the second could cause a reduction.   But if
farmers in those parts of Mexican agriculture that are uncompetitive join the hired labor force, a
large scale internal migration in search of work would likely result.  This could swamp any
positive employment effects in the competitive export sectors of agriculture stemming from
NAFTA.
Within Canada, the traditional interest groups in the food and agriculture sector are caught
between relative indifference to NAFTA and strongly stated opposition to this or any other
reduction in trade protection.  The indifference may be due to the views that (a) Canada's red
meat sector is competitive with the U.S. and the Mexican livestock industry represents no great
threat or opportunity, (b) the grain and oilseeds sector faces no competitive threat from itsMexican counterpart and can anticipate only modest potential export opportunities, and (c) the
ongoing GATT negotiations and U.S. competition are much more important to their supply-
managed sectors.  The strong opposition arises in the food processing and fruit and vegetable
sectors, where there are fears of potential competition from Mexican imports.  Current concerns
expressed by these sectors echo the pre-CUSTA discussions.  In food processing the fear is that
lower wages in Mexico will provoke a significant loss of market share and a movement of
processing plants and employment to Mexico.  In vegetables and soft fruits there are similar,
perhaps less pronounced, fears that lower costs in Mexico will lead to the loss of farm production
to Mexico.  This concern is moderated by the fact that current Mexican produce marketing is to a
considerable extent outside the Canadian product season.  And as discussed above, there are
special fears in the environment and food safety areas concerning the "unfairness" of Mexican
producers' access to banned (in Canada) pesticides, their operation under less demanding
environmental standards, and the possible introduction of pests or diseases to Canada from
Mexico.
Some of these arguments represent posturing to maintain protection for as long as
possible or to advance claims for "adequate" compensation in the event of a loss of protection.  It
is also true that, before ratification, CUSTA was met with greater hostility.  Still, Canadian
politicians are hearing little support from the Canadian food sector at any level for a NAFTA to
include agriculture, and there is little expressed support from consumers. 
3. Market Access Issues
The central issue in the agricultural portion of the NAFTA negotiations will be the ease of
access of North American agricultural products into the three markets. The trade impediments can
be grouped under three headings: (a) import access, including agricultural tariffs, import licensing,
and marketing orders; (b) health, safety and environmental standards; and (c) domestic price
support policies.
a) Import barriers
Agricultural tariffs are likely to be reduced on a timetable tied to that for other sectors.  If
different timescales are allowed, there will be negotiations to determine which agricultural
products are granted a longer period to adjust.  Equity would suggest that Mexican tariffs could
be allowed a slower pace of reduction, as that country might seem to require more time to
establish and expand export industries.  In practice, Mexico has showed itself willing to make
much more dramatic changes in its tariff policy than can be expected of either the U.S. or Canada. 
Moreover, on economic grounds the concession of a long transition period may be against
Mexican interests if it delays needed investment flows.
One aspect of existing tariff policy that will become increasingly inconsistent with closer
integration in North America is seasonality in tariffs.  Common in fruits and vegetables, such
seasonality gives a boost in protection at the time of local harvest.  In an integrated North
American agricultural market, no such seasonal protection would be appropriate.  Farmers are4GPV￿UGGMKPI CEVKXKVKGU KP VJKU KPUVCPEG CTG QHVGP HQEWUGF QP UOCNN GZVGPUKQPU QH VJG JKIJ￿VCTKHH RGTKQF VQ ECRVWTG
￿
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RTQFWEVU￿ KPENWFKPI VQOCVQGU￿ QPKQPU￿ CPF ITCRGU￿ GZRQTVGF HTQO /GZKEQ￿
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naturally more competitive at certain times of the year: government "help" at those times has the
effect of distorting such regional and seasonal production patterns.  Although an agreement to
phase out all tariffs will eventually remove the seasonality issue, an early start on this process
would have immediate beneficial effects on investment decisions.  The Mexican market for fresh
fruit has often been closed during harvest season: as U.S. and Canadian tariff seasonality is
removed, the Mexican restrictions should also be lifted.  One would not expect this to result in a
major expansion of trade, but the act of encouraging competition throughout the year will send a
clear signal to the private sector and the opportunities for rent-seeking will be reduced.
6
From the point of view of the U.S., the negotiations are likely to highlight as a trade
irritant the Mexican import licensing procedure which restricts imports of wheat, corn, beans,
some livestock products, fresh fruits and certain vegetables.  Although many of these licences
have been removed since Mexico joined the GATT in 1986, and others are scheduled to be
changed in the next few years, securing this liberalization in the terms of a NAFTA would be of
value to U.S. export interests.
7
The issue of marketing orders in the U.S. is a similar trade irritant for the Mexican
exporter.  Set up under federal laws, these marketing orders attempt to control the quality (and
hence quantity) of supplies going onto the domestic market.   In some cases, quantity is directly
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controlled: in most cases the setting of particular grading standards effectively limits supply. 
Imports are not subject to direct quantitative controls, but manipulation of grading standards has
the effect of regulating imports.  The use of marketing orders to restrict market access for imports
is well illustrated in the fruit and vegetable sector.
9
Under a more ambitious sectoral integration in the NAFTA, a first best solution would
involve eventual removal of this trade irritant.  A second best approach could follow the principle
of sectoral integration but alter the operation of U.S. marketing orders to make it easier for
imported products to meet required grades.  Estimates of market requirements and supplies could
be made which recognized the role of imports and supply conditions in Mexico (and Canada).  
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The use of marketing orders as a hidden trade barrier could be mitigated by greater transparency
through a change in the way in which they operate.’PXKTQPOGPVCN KUUWGU TGICTFKPI ETQUU￿DQTFGT RQNNWVKQP JCXG VQ DG FGCNV YKVJ QP C DKPCVKQPCN ￿QT VTKPCVKQPCN￿
￿￿
DCUKU TGICTFNGUU QH VJG EQPFKVKQPU HQT VTCFG CETQUU VJG DQTFGT￿
b) Health and Safety Standards
The problem of disparate health and safety standards in food and agricultural production
has been contentious in recent trade negotiations.  Some limited attempts were made in the
CUSTA to reduce trade frictions, but the issue was essentially left to discussions in the GATT. 
Those opposed to the NAFTA negotiations have highlighted food standards and environmental
pollution as key issues with the result that they will have to be addressed in even a modest
agreement.  The formulation of such an agreement is likely to focus on the need to improve
adherence to existing regulations in Mexico and on making those regulations conform with
practices in the U.S. and Canada.
On the issue of health, safety, and environmental regulations, sectoral integration poses a
greater challenge than does the attempt to reduce trade friction.  It requires a re-evaluation of the
purposes of such regulations and the methods used for their enforcement.  Government
regulations in this area can be thought of as meeting four needs: a) protection of consumers from
unsafe food; b) protection of workers from unhealthy working conditions; c) protection of the
environment from contamination; and d) protection of plants and animals from disease. 
Assessment of risks in each of these areas will differ in different countries: the challenge for an
integrated agricultural market is to respect these differences and even to lower the cost of
providing such protection.  Enforcement of U.S. standards, on such issues as pesticide use, is an
attractive part of a "trade irritant" approach: it may not be appropriate in sectoral integration.
How can differences in risk assessment be made consistent with sectoral free trade? 
Primarily by removing the mechanism by which health and safety standards become hidden trade
barriers -- the testing of imports at the border.  Protection of consumers could be accomplished by
rules (which could differ between Mexico, the U.S. and Canada) governing food safety for
products regardless of origin.  Wherever the testing were done, "national treatment" should be
strictly observed.  Rent-seeking opportunities would be reduced by such a development, and
production could be planned for different parts of the market without fear of discriminatory
application of regulations.  By the same token, different environmental and worker safety laws can
coexist with free trade.   Each country is responsible for the health of its own workers and the
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degradation of its own environment.  Arguments that trade allows some countries to exploit less
onerous environmental regulations are usually calls for protection, and should not be heeded in
sectoral integration (as opposed to trade irritant) talks.
c) Domestic Policies
It seems likely that in a modest agricultural component of a NAFTA, domestic farm
policies will not be subject to much change.  Mexican policy is presently in a state of transition. 
The reduced use of import controls through the licensing system will have implications for cereal
policy.  But Mexico under such a modest agreement would still be able to adopt domestic price
support and marketing policies to maintain desired prices to farmers and consumers.  Just as the(QT C FGVCKNGF CEEQWPV QH DKPCVKQPCN EQQRGTCVKQP QP ITCKP OCTMGVKPI￿ UGG 6JGQFQTG *￿ %QJP ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿
CUSTA left the issue of support price differences to GATT talks, a modest NAFTA would also
leave this stone unturned.
The question remains as to how to deal with disparate domestic price support policies and
price levels in negotiation on sectoral integration.  Clearly some coordination is needed, at least de
facto, to avoid investment distortions.  CUSTA took a tentative step in this direction by triggering
a relaxation of import licensing by the relative level of support (as measured by the Producer
Subsidy Equivalents, PSE) in each country.  Imports are freely allowed if the partner does not
have a higher level of subsidy.  The penalty for setting high producer prices is the loss of import
restrictions, such as licenses, to protect the domestic market.  How well such a procedure would
work in the case of Mexico is open to question.  It is likely that Mexico will seek to provide
higher prices for certain products, such as white corn and dry beans, than would be desirable
under U.S. policy.  This subject will be less of an issue as Mexico moves towards tariff protection
and away from import licenses and state trading.
Can such arrangements for sectoral integration evolve into a common approach to
common problems in the three countries?  The political case for a coordinated set of policies
regulating markets, trade, and production practices has yet to be made.  The progress made in the
EC in its 1992 program has indicated that some sharing of sovereignty is possible in economic
policies.  In the case of agriculture, the EC has provided a clear example of how not to run a
common policy.  By setting and maintaining a high level of protection against goods from outside
the Community, the EC created a monster which threatens not just European cohesion but the
world's trading system.  But common policies need not be protectionist, expensive, or disruptive
of world trade.
A coordinated agricultural policy for North America could start with uniform external
trade policy.  As tariffs are eliminated on intra-NAFTA trade, so they could be harmonized on
trade with third countries.  Non-tariff measures (on third country trade) could be converted to
tariffs, as is the case in the GATT proposals of the U.S. and the Cairns Group.  Though
harmonization of export policies would be hampered by different institutional arrangements for
marketing, U.S. and Canadian collaboration has occurred in the past.   Most of the pressure for
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harmonization would, however, fall on domestic price support programs.  If these policies
remained as independent, domestically-oriented market intervention programs to support the
incomes of particular farm groups at historically-determined levels then there would be little hope
for their harmonization.  Two changes have to happen for common policies to emerge.  First the
policies have to shift from operating indirectly through commodity markets to being designed to
target directly particular income or other needs.  This "decoupling" is a prerequisite for closer
trinational cooperation.  Secondly, the levels of market support prices have to be brought more in
line among the three countries.  Without this development it is difficult to see a true market
integration.  With broadly decoupled and carefully targeted income programs and stabilization
programs with similar price objectives (including coordination of storage programs) it should be
possible to maintain distinct national policies (and national jurisdiction over such policies) while atthe same time supporting the development of trade and investment among the three North
American partners.  This is the same challenge which is at the core of the GATT negotiations over
agriculture in the current Uruguay Round.
III.  THE GRAINS AND OILSEEDS SECTOR:
IMPACTS OF NAFTA ON DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL POLICY
1. Present Trade Patterns
Grains and oilseeds figure prominently in both North American agricultural production
and trade and they will play a key role during the transition to trade liberalization.  Table 1 reports
production figures for Canada, Mexico and the U.S. for the 1989-90 crop year.  At 341 million
tons, U.S. grain and oilseed production clearly dominates production in Canada (52.8 mmt) and
Mexico (19.9 mmt).  Coarse grains (primarily corn) account for the largest share of production in
both Mexico and the U.S.  In contrast, wheat is the largest crop in Canada.
In order to provide a basis for discussion of the effects of freer trade, a trade flow matrix
showing the current situation is provided in Table 2.  From this data we find that grains and
oilseeds flow both north and south within the continent.  On a net basis, the U.S. enjoys a small
trade surplus with Canada in grains and oilseeds.  Both Canada and the U.S. have a trade surplus
with Mexico; however, the absolute sizes are much different.  Canada nets less than $100 million
per year in this trade relationship, while the U.S. nets over $1 billion per year.  In fact, the two
main agricultural exports from the U.S. to Mexico are coarse grains and oilseeds.  Mexico
accounts for over 10 percent of total U.S. coarse grain exports, and around 6 percent of total
oilseed exports.  Grains and oilseeds account for approximately 70 percent of total U.S.
agricultural exports to Mexico.  Wheat and canola (rapeseed) dominate Canada's agricultural
exports to Mexico, and cereal grains and oilseeds are important in bilateral trade between Canada
and the U.S.  Canada imports corn, soybeans and soymeal from the U.S., but U.S. exports of corn
and oilseeds to Canada rank below animals, fruits and nuts, and vegetables.  Wheat and canola
rank as Canada's second and third largest agricultural exports to the U.S., behind animals.Table 1
Grain and Oilseed Production in North America
(in million tons):  1989-90
Total Grains Wheat Coarse Oilseeds Rice
and Oilseeds Grains
Canada  52.8 24.4  23.5 4.9 0
Mexico  19.9 4.0  14.1 1.4 0.4
U.S. 341.0 55.4 221.4 59.3 4.9
Source:  USITC "The Likely Impact on the United States of a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico",
Pub. No. 2353, Feb. 1991
Table 2
Grains/Feeds & Oilseeds in N.A. trade: 1988
(in millions of $U.S.)
                  Grains & Feeds Oilseeds Trade Matrix
     To Trade Matrix
From Canada Mexico U.S. Canada Mexico U.S.
Canada   - 30 425   -  45 257
Mexico   0 -  18   0    -   27
U.S. 354 645   - 315 587    -
Source:  compiled from USDA data6JG KUUWG QH FQOGUVKE RTKEG UWRRQTVU CPF CEEQORCP[KPI VTCFG RQNKEKGU HQT VJG ITCKP￿QKNUGGF￿NKXGUVQEM
￿￿
EQORNGZ KU CNUQ CV VJG JGCTV QH VJG CITKEWNVWTCN FKUEWUUKQPU KP VJG )#66￿ ’ZRQTVGTU CTG RWUJKPI HQT HKTO
EQOOKVOGPVU HTQO KORQTVKPI EQWPVTKGU QP ITGCVGT CEEGUU￿ NGCFKPI GXGPVWCNN[ VQ C VTCPURCTGPV U[UVGO QH VCTKHHU YJKEJ
VJGOUGNXGU YQWNF DG UWDLGEV VQ FQYPYCTF PGIQVKCVKQP￿ ’ZRQTV UWDUKFKGU￿ WPFGT VJKU CIGPFC￿ YQWNF DG RJCUGF QWV￿
CPF FQOGUVKE UWDUKFKGU VJCV GPEQWTCIG QWVRWV YQWNF CNUQ DG TGFWEGF￿ ’CEJ EQWPVT[ YQWNF JCXG VQ EQOOKV VQ C
UEJGFWNGF TGFWEVKQP KP UWRRQTV WPFGT C )#66 RCEV￿ CPF CITGG VQ OQFKH[ KVU RQNKE[ KPUVTWOGPVU￿ *QY OWEJ HWTVJGT
VJG 0QTVJ #OGTKECP EQWPVTKGU YQWNF YKUJ VQ IQ QP TWNGU HQT KPVTC￿TGIKQPCN VTCFG YKNN DG FGRGPFGPV QP VJG UKIPKHKECPEG
QH VJG )#66 QWVEQOG￿
2. Policy Issues for Mexico
All three governments would prefer to keep the focus of the NAFTA negotiations on trade
and investment matters.  In agriculture, trade matters are so intimately linked with domestic policy
that the distinction is impossible to maintain.  Investment in agriculture is also at the heart of rural
development policy, and conditions agreed upon for foreign investment in Mexico will have an
impact on these "internal" matters.  This intermingling of trade and domestic policy will pose
some of the most difficult problems for the negotiators in agriculture.   Many issues that are "off
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the table" will nevertheless be influenced by the outcome, and will constrain and influence
negotiators.  Some of these issues constitute the most critical areas of interface between trade
policy and domestic agricultural policy.
a) Rural Poverty and Food Security in Mexico
The issues of Mexico's rural poverty and food security provide an important backdrop to
the grains/oilseeds sector, and have long been contentious.  Mexican agriculture has an
internationally competitive export-oriented sector that has expanded into new markets and
contributed to economic growth.  It is found mainly in the northern states, providing fruits and
vegetables for the U.S. market, but it also includes coffee production in the tropical south. 
However, a large part of Mexican agriculture is much less competitive, and consists of small
farms on poor soils with little access to irrigation.  In these poorer regions the commodities
produced are predominantly corn and beans.  They are mainly produced for local consumption
and yield low cash incomes.  Rural poverty is widespread, and food supplies are dependent upon
regular rainfall.  This sector is clearly vulnerable to an opening up of the domestic market to grain
imports from the U.S.  Present policy restricts imports of corn and maintains high domestic
support prices for these producers.  
Thus, Mexico is experiencing the classic dilemma of a country facing the challenge of
liberalization.  Low market prices and cheap imports would reduce the cost of feeding the urban
population and rural workers.  Food subsidy schemes would be easier to finance under such
conditions and could be targeted towards the poorest and most vulnerable groups.  But domestic
production may not be able to compete at such low prices, and the productive base of many rural
areas would be jeopardized, leading to rural poverty and unemployment.  Massive support for
these rural areas could be undertaken in an attempt to make the domestic industry competitive,
but this is likely to prove slow, expensive, and risky.  Cherished political institutions, such as land
tenure laws, often retard the agricultural restructuring, a particular issue in Mexico where the6JG /GZKECP CFOKPKUVTCVKQP JCU TGEGPVN[ RTQRQUGF OCLQT EJCPIGU KP VJG GLKFQ U[UVGO YJKEJ YQWNF OCMG
￿￿
KV GCUKGT HQT UVTWEVWTCN EJCPIG VQ VCMG RNCEG￿
ejido system makes the amalgamation of farms and the necessary investment in those farms
problematic.   A regime of high farm prices, the alternative ("European") model for rural
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development, would allow private investment from higher earnings and reduce elements of rural
poverty, but it would exacerbate the urban food problem and raise the cost of food subsidies. 
More significantly, in terms of a trade agreement, it would require the continuation of quantitative
control over imports or variable trade taxes linked to domestic price objectives.  Negotiators will
have to be sensitive to the substantial social, economic, and political problems posed by these
issues.
b) Grains, Oilseeds and Livestock Policy Options
Closely connected with the issue of food security is that of the future development of the
grain-oilseed-livestock complex in Mexico and its relationship with other parts of North America. 
The outcome of decisions to solve the problems of rural development and food security will
circumscribe policy in this area.  If it is decided to keep strict control over imports of basic foods,
paying high prices to farmers but charging less to domestic grain users, then it is reasonable to
assume that present institutional arrangements will persist.  There may be a need for additional
investment in infrastructure, but this would have only limited appeal to foreign investors.  If,
however, a more ambitious strategy were adopted, the picture would change.  Liberalization of
import policies could be accompanied by further deregulation of the internal market, and a greater
role for private sector participation.  Foreign investment in infrastructure, such as grain handling
facilities, could follow and thereby lead to lower marketing costs.  The livestock industry, at least
in some regions of Mexico, could benefit considerably from a relaxation of rules governing the
use of wheat and corn for feed.
The grains and oilseeds sector includes some of the most sensitive domestic policies to be
affected by freer North American trade in agriculture, notably Mexican cereals policy.  Our brief
examination begins with an overview of this sector, then turns to a more detailed analysis of the
Mexican government's recent and unsuccessful attempts to liberalize its sorghum market, the
country's second largest crop after corn.  The size and immediacy of producer income losses
arising from sorghum market deregulation became evident during this attempt, emphasizing the
seriousness of the constraints facing Mexico in reducing the levels of protection in its domestic
grains markets.
Just like Canada and the U.S., Mexico provides domestic production subsidies to its grains
and oilseeds sector.  Despite these production subsidies, Mexico is not self sufficient, and imports
about one-quarter of its corn and three-fourths of its soybean needs.  The imported corn is for
human consumption, in the form of tortillas and maize flour. 
What will be some of the impacts on the grains and oilseeds sectors of the three countries
in a NAFTA?  Will U.S. and Canadian exports of grains and oilseeds expand rapidly?  The single
most important unknown is the question of what Mexico will do with its corn policy.  Corn is the$CTT[ -TKUUQHH￿ 2GVGT .KCRKU￿ ,QJP .KPM CPF .KCPC 0GHH ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿
5CPVKCIQ .GX[ CPF 5YGFGT XCP 9KLPDGTIGP ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿
’￿ .GKIJ $KXKPIU ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿
foundation of Mexican food production and the entire Mexican rural economy.  Over one-third of
Mexican arable land is devoted to corn production.  Current corn policy results in both urban and
rural economic distortions.  Main elements of the policy include: a) import licenses, b) producer
prices that are set well above world prices, c) subsidized consumer prices in urban areas, and d)
parastatal marketing, distribution and storage.  Mexico also restricts imports of other cereals
through the use of tariffs.
Given this protection, it is expected that freer trade will lead to a significant increase in
imports from both Canada and the United States.  One would expect that if Mexican corn
subsidies were reduced, then corn production would drop significantly.  This development would
provide an opportunity for the U.S. to increase corn shipments to Mexico, but the substitutability
of U.S. yellow corn for Mexican white corn may be limited.  There is a small amount of
production of white corn in the U.S. and perhaps this would increase to meet this new Mexican
demand.  At least two quantitative estimates are available on the likely magnitude of this outcome. 
Krissoff et al. have modelled the impact of a U.S.-Mexican free trade agreement (without
Canada).   Using 1988 as a base period, they estimated that with a liberalization of Mexican corn
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policy, the U.S. would increase its exports of corn to Mexico by about 5% and that the
production of corn in Mexico would fall by 5%.  Total consumption of corn in Mexico would
increase by 14% (or 1.8 mmt).  Levy and Wijnbergen examined the impacts on the Mexican
economy of liberalizing its corn market.   Their model results suggest that the net welfare cost of
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this policy change would be $154 million ($US) per annum.  Of this, Mexico "loses" $122 million
to the rural area and $32 million to the urban area.  This welfare loss is only about 1% of the
value of Mexican agricultural output.
The above discussion presumes there will be no significant land reform in Mexico.  Yet, as
part of the deregulation and trade liberalization drive in Mexico, the government recently
proposed a major modification of its land tenure laws that will effectively consolidate farms in
Mexico.  If enacted, this reform could promote increased investment in Mexican agriculture and
enhance agricultural productivity, including grains and oilseeds production.  Such a development
could, in turn, be expected to alter the anticipated effects of a NAFTA on this sector.
3. Factors Impeding the Smooth Transition to Liberalized Grain Markets
While the efficiency of grain production in Mexico may well increase in the long run as a
result of farm consolidation, Mexico still faces some short-to-medium run challenges with respect
to grain trade and domestic market liberalization.  Recent research on the Mexican government's
short-lived attempt to remove all trade restrictions on sorghum, and to withdraw from all state
intervention in domestic marketing in late 1989 provides a case in point (Bivings, forthcoming).  
176JG OQFGN TGUWNVU UWIIGUV VJCV QP CXGTCIG￿ UQTIJWO HCTOGTU￿ PGV KPEQOG YQWNF JCXG FGENKPGF D[ QXGT ￿￿￿
￿￿
KP TGCN VGTOU JCF VJG IQXGTPOGPV PQV TGKPVTQFWEGF VTCFG CPF FQOGUVKE UWRRQTV RQNKEKGU￿ /QTGQXGT￿ KORQTVU YQWNF
JCXG TKUGP D[ CNOQUV C OKNNKQP OGVTKE VQPU￿
6JG JKIJ EQUV KU RCTVKCNN[ CVVTKDWVCDNG VQ RQQT TCKN KPHTCUVTWEVWTG CPF NCEM QH UWHHKEKGPV TCKNECTU KP /GZKEQ￿ #U
￿￿
C TGUWNV￿ ITCKP KU QHVGP VTCPURQTVGF D[ VTWEM￿ GXGP HQT XGT[ NQPI FKUVCPEGU￿
Using a seasonally and regionally disaggregated trade model, the research quantifies the impact of
a series of macroeconomic and structural problems on liberalized seasonal sorghum prices in
Mexico.  The model results indicate that had the Mexican government allowed prices to play an
equilibrating role, liberalized sorghum prices would have fallen far below their import parity levels
at harvest time, `overshooting' their long-run equilibrium levels.  The loss of income to farmers
would have been severe and immediate.   The prospects of a collapsing market undoubtedly
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contributed to the government's decision to return to the sorghum market and purchase the entire
1990 summer crop to stabilize prices.  More recently, the government has begun to experiment
with seasonal tariffs and some compensatory storage financing.  
a) High Storage Costs
A factor that would have contributed to the downward pressure in market-determined
sorghum prices in 1990 is the relatively high physical and financial costs of storing grain in
Mexico (the latter exacerbated by Mexico's macroeconomic adjustment problems), together with
the need for seasonal storage of the crop.  With the complete withdrawal of CONASUPO, the
livestock sector was expected to store the summer crop irrespective of the high costs of doing so. 
Yet with free trade, livestock producers could arbitrage the storage cost differential by importing
sorghum from the U.S. on a monthly basis to minimize total storage costs.  As a result, there
would have been little demand for the domestic harvest at import parity prices.
b) Spatial Allocation
The spatial allocation of sorghum production relative to consumption in Mexico would
also have contributed to depressed harvest prices under liberalization.  About 80% of the
domestic sorghum crop is produced in two regions in Mexico.  By contrast, livestock operations
are found throughout the country but with several of the principal centers located far from the
two main production regions.  Consequently, the cost of transporting feed to livestock can be as
high as 30% of the delivered price.   With the withdrawal of CONASUPO, however, the
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livestock sector was expected to pay the full delivered cost of the summer 1990 harvest.  For
many livestock producers, this was an unattractive option since, in terms of transport costs, they
are effectively closer to U.S. sorghum production regions.  Without import restrictions, domestic
harvest prices would either have to immediately reflect the transport cost differential or the crop
would have to be stored for a longer period of time for future (more local) consumption.  The
combination of the two factors would have put additional downward pressure on harvest prices.c) Export Credit Subsidies
  An additional factor which contributed to lack of demand for the summer sorghum crop
was the availability of attractive financing to Mexican livestock producers to purchase imported
sorghum and other grains from the U.S.  Under this program, termed GSM-102, livestock
producers in Mexico can borrow dollars at just over the London interbank offer rate (LIBOR-
Eurodollar).  With import licenses and CONASUPO's participation, however, the total amount of
credit available to producers has historically been limited.  Yet with a liberalized market, livestock
producers were to receive complete access to the credit facility.  Thus, livestock producers would
have had little incentive to purchase domestic sorghum at import parity prices, even for immediate
use. 
In summary, in the absence of trade restrictions and domestic market intervention, flexible
grain prices in Mexico can be expected to reflect the actual costs of storage and transport, as well
as the impact of current price discriminatory policies, and adverse monetary and exchange rate
developments.  Unfortunately, these same factors will likely depress domestic grain prices below
their import parity levels exacerbating the burden of adjustment Mexican farmers would face
under a NAFTA.  In the case of wheat, Mexican production displays pronounced seasonality and
extreme regional concentration far from principal domestic consumption centers.  Furthermore,
infrastructure problems and the difficulty of competing with subsidized wheat exports from
Canada and the U.S. complicate Mexico's ability to export excess production.  The corn market
also displays some of these characteristics, particularly since a substantial share of the domestic
crop is produced by smaller farmers in areas poorly served by existing road and rail infrastructure. 
Moreover, like sorghum, corn prices (and hence, producers) would bear the burden of the large
and growing export credit subsidies from the U.S., and of macroeconomic structural adjustments
that suggest that Mexico's real exchange rate may continue to appreciate in the short to medium
run. 
To the extent that policymakers in Mexico are concerned about the grains sector
shouldering a disproportionate share of the burden of adjustment in the presence of these
problems, there will be a need for a sectoral policy for some time. Indeed, constraints such as
those outlined here can be expected to guide, in part, the formulation and timing of domestic
policy reform as well as Mexico's negotiating stance in the NAFTA agricultural discussions.  
IV.  FRUIT AND VEGETABLE SECTOR:
ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND SAFETY AND MARKET ACCESS ISSUES
The fruit and vegetable sector is an important one in any NAFTA, not only because it is a
significant component of trilateral agricultural trade flows but also because it illustrates clearly the
problems in resolving two of the more important issues under discussion in the GATT: (a)
phytosanitary and health/food safety regulations, and (b) market access, through quality standards
and restrictions.Although these issues are important within the GATT, the NAFTA talks will be focussed
largely on bilateral and trilateral issues and much less influenced by progress in the GATT.  The
explicit issues will be primarily questions of access to the U.S. markets for Mexican produce. 
Therefore, the subject will tend to be dominated by the interests of the U.S. vegetable producing
states and northern Mexico.  Behind these trade access matters lies a bundle of issues,
encompassing environmental, health and food safety regulations (and particularly pesticide and
phytosanitary regulations), that will go a long way to defining the impact on trade of the
agricultural part of the agreement.  To provide a closer examination of these issues, this sector is
reviewed in greater detail.
1. Background
Fresh fruit and vegetable trade flows among the three countries participating in the
NAFTA negotiations are predominantly from south to north, with a relatively small amount of
reverse flows (see figure 2). In addition, most of that trade takes place with the adjacent country: 
the 1989 value of fresh fruit, nuts and fresh and frozen vegetables crossing from Mexico to the
United States was just under 900 million (US) dollars and for trade from the United States to
Canada the value of fresh fruits, vegetables and nuts was 560 million dollars, versus 46 million
from Mexico to Canada.  Since CUSTA is already in the implementation phase, the trade flow
likely to be the most affected by a NAFTA is that of fresh fruits and vegetables imported by the
U.S. from Mexico.
The composition of these trade flows are striking.  United States imports of fresh
vegetables from Mexico are more than triple the value of fresh fruit imports, while nut imports are
insignificant (Figure 3).  Mexico and Canada together represented the source of 87 percent of
U.S. imports of fresh and frozen vegetables, with nearly three quarters of the total coming from
Mexico (Figure 4).  Canadian exports of fresh produce to the United States were also
predominantly comprised of vegetables, but its share (12 percent) of this category of imports was
much smaller than Mexico's in 1990.  Within the fresh and frozen vegetables category, imports of
Mexican fresh tomatoes clearly dominates, with fresh peppers, cucumbers and squash distant
runners-up (Figure 5).  In terms of market shares, fresh produce items for which Mexico
represented at least three-fourths of the U.S. import total (value) for 1989 include:  eggplant (99
percent), tomatoes and squash (97 percent each), cucumbers (94 percent), onions (89 percent),
mangoes (88 percent), lettuce (84 percent) and strawberries (75 percent).  Imports of most of
these items are highly seasonal, concentrated in the fall, winter, and spring months.  Figure 6
shows the 1990 seasonal pattern for fresh tomato imports, a pattern which is roughly typical for
nontropical fresh produce imports.
It can be argued that, in several production and marketing aspects, fresh fruits and
vegetables are the quintessential agricultural products.  Production, especially of fruits, is highly
location specific; output of most items is concentrated into a short harvest season; storability of all
but a few fresh produce items is significantly limited; transportability may also be subject to
technical and time constraints; and where there is cross-border trade, phytosanitary and pesticide
residue issues come into play.6JGTG OC[ CNUQ DG UQOG OQTG UWDVNG JCDKV HQTOCVKQP GHHGEVU￿ CU EQPUWOGTU DGEQOG CEEWUVQOGF VQ GCVKPI
￿￿
C RCTVKEWNCT HTWKV QT XGIGVCDNG￿
*QYGXGT￿ KP EQPVTCUV VQ FGOCPF HQT OCP[ HQQF RTQFWEVU￿ C )KCPPKPK (QWPFCVKQP UWTXG[ QH GUVKOCVGF FGOCPF
￿￿
TGNCVKQPUJKRU HQT ITCRGU￿ VTGG HTWKVU CPF PWVU￿ TGXGCNGF VJCV QDUGTXGF OCTMGV FGOCPF V[RKECNN[ KU QYP RTKEG GNCUVKE
HQT VJGUG RTQFWEVU￿ ￿5GG &GOCPF 4GNCVKQPUJKRU HQT %CNKHQTPKC 6TGG(TWKVU￿ )TCRGU CPF 0WVU￿ )KCPPKPK (QWPFCVKQP
URGEKCN 2WDNKECVKQP ￿￿￿￿￿ #WIWUV ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6JWU￿ KH OCTMGV UWRRN[ KU KPETGCUGF FWG VQ KORQTVU￿ C TGNCVKXGN[ UOCNN RTKEG
FGENKPG YKNN UGTXG VQ ENGCT VJG OCTMGV￿
There are a number of characteristics of the sub-sector which have implications for
international trade and trade liberalization.  Perishability, localized production, and short,
geographically dispersed growing seasons place biological constraints on direct competition
between the products of different locales: although Ontario and northern Mexico may both grow
and sell fresh market tomatoes, their products are unlikely to face each other in the market. 
Offsetting this reduced competition is the vulnerability of producers to competition during their
harvest seasons since the product's quality declines rapidly over time.
Due to the limited storability of soft fresh fruits and vegetables such as tomatoes, peaches
or raspberries, and the somewhat limited storability of others such as citrus fruits, potatoes and
apples, fresh fruits and vegetables are distinguished not only by type and variety, but also by time
of harvest.  A basket of fresh raspberries in June is not a very close substitute for one in
September.  Deterioration of product quality during modified atmosphere storage also renders
products such as grapes and apples sold from lengthy  storage distinguishable from those sold
immediately after harvest.  When such product attributes are combined with the geographic
dispersion of production and harvest, the associated effects on competition among geographic
areas in these products are easily identified:  for soft produce items, only areas having overlapping
harvest seasons are likely to be in direct competition in the fresh market; in some cases temporal
dispersion of harvest will render otherwise identical products complements since year-round
availability and relatively stable prices can affect the willingness of restaurants to include such
items on their menus.   But when direct competition does emerge, it has the potential to have
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market price consequences ; and the vagaries of weather conditions will affect which locales are
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competing in which product markets in any given year.
Technological changes, particularly in transportation, packaging and storage, but also
developments which provide new varieties, continue to expand the geographic and temporal
extent of the market potentially available for a region's fresh produce suppliers.  Such advances
bring new sets of producers into competition with one another.  This is true, of course, within as
well as across national boundaries.  The seasonal tariffs commonly in force for fresh produce
items is a logical outgrowth of domestic producers' desires to limit such competition and to
maintain or to expand their historic market area.  The existence of such tariff protection attests to
the political influence exerted by concentrated groups of producers.  Removal of seasonal tariffs
and other protectionist measures will have a tendency to hasten adjustment of the supply side of
the market to both existing and future technological advances.%CPCFC￿U VCTKHHU CPF OCTMGVKPI DQCTFU JCXG UKOKNCT KPVGPV CPF GHHGEVU QP VJG UGCUQPCNKV[ QH OCTMGV CEEGUU
￿￿
HQT EQORGVKPI HTGUJ RTQFWEG KORQTVU￿ 6JG NKOKVGF QXGTNCR KP JCTXGUV UGCUQPU DGVYGGP /GZKEQ CPF %CPCFC OGCPU
VJCV %CPCFKCP DCTTKGTU CTG GHHGEVKXGN[ HCKTN[ NQY HQT /GZKECP HTGUJ RTQFWEG GZRQTVGTU￿
-CVJCTKPG %￿ $WEMNG[ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿
2. Existing Trade Barriers
The two major types of trade barriers impeding United States imports of fresh fruits and
vegetables are tariffs and marketing order provisions.  In many cases they are structured in a way
which accentuates any innate geographic tendencies toward seasonality in trade flows for
competing produce items.   Take just two examples:  in 1988 the ad valorem equivalent tariff
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levied on fresh tomato imports into the U.S. ranged from a low of 7 percent in the mid-November
through February period to a high of 11.5 percent in the March through mid-July and September
through mid-November periods; the year is divided into five tariff "seasons" for fresh cucumbers,
with ad valorem equivalent tariffs ranging from a low of 5.8 percent in July and August to a high
of 35.9 percent in March and April; both items were also subject to federal marketing order
standards during certain periods.   Relaxation or removal of barriers of this magnitude can be
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expected to have a substantial effect on the competitive positions of affected domestic versus
Mexican producers.  A third type of barrier, phytosanitary restrictions, results in the quarantine of
some produce shipments to control the spread of fruit flies and other pests, and at present
completely inhibit imports of a few items such as potatoes and avocados.
Mexican trade barriers include tariffs (up to a maximum of 20 percent, ad valorem),
import licenses for some items including potatoes, peaches, nectarines and grapes, and
phytosanitary restrictions.  A more comprehensive license/quota system and tariffs of up to 100
percent ad valorem were in effect until recently.  The unilateral moves toward a more open
market have already improved access for fresh produce from the U.S. and Canada.  The reduction
and removal of remaining tariffs following a NAFTA is not likely to have as much long run effect
on markets as will the liberalization which has already occurred.  For example, apple and pear
shippers from the Pacific Northwest region of the U.S. are actively pursuing the Mexican market
following the recent liberalization.  The types of problems they have encountered -- long shipping
times to the ultimate market and unusually extended lags between shipment and receipt of
payment -- are not the sort that can be eliminated at the negotiating table.  However, insofar as it
codifies the earlier liberalization moves, a trilateral agreement may lead to a greater willingness on
the part of northern fruit distributors to invest in the establishment of market channels in Mexico.
3. Food Safety:  Pesticides and Phytosanitary Regulations
a) Pesticides
Most pesticide issues stem from the existence of different sets of standards, regulations,
and enforcement mechanisms arising from different production practices, different climatic
conditions, and different assessments of risk.  Reports of the sale in Mexico and elsewhere of(QQF 5CHGV[ CPF 3WCNKV[￿ (KXG %QWPVTKGU￿ ’HHQTVU VQ /GGV 7￿5￿ 4GSWKTGOGPVU QP +ORQTVGF 2TQFWEG￿ 7PKVGF
￿￿
5VCVGU )GPGTCN #EEQWPVKPI 1HHKEG￿ 9CUJKPIVQP￿ &￿%￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
pesticides banned in the United States have raised many concerns.  First, consumers and consumer
groups suspect that produce imported to the United States from Mexico may contain residues of
illegal pesticides.  A less well developed government infrastructure for the monitoring and
enforcing of pesticide use adds to those fears.  Second, environmental groups have also raised
concerns that increased exports of fresh produce to the United States will translate into increases
in environmental degradation in Mexico, in part due to expanded use of both legal and illegal (by
U.S. standards) pesticides.  Third, others have raised the issue of inadequate protection of field
workers in Mexico and fear that their welfare may be negatively affected by more frequent or
intensive exposure to chemical pesticides as a consequence of enhanced export market
opportunities.  Finally, producers of competing products in the United States fear that their rivals'
use of banned pesticides may confer a cost advantage, allowing them to undercut the domestic
product on a price basis.  From the exporters' perspective, excessive border inspections can inflict
costly delays for produce meeting the standards, while rejected shipments are unlikely to find an
acceptable alternative market before the product spoils.
On the subject of illegal pesticide use in Mexico, the U.S. Government Accounting Office
(GAO) has found that most pesticides disallowed by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), through Agency cancellation, suspension or voluntary cancellation, are also not registered
for use in Mexico.   A listing of the status of twenty-six pesticides cancelled or suspended by the
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EPA showed that only five were registered for use in Mexico.  Of these, four have tolerances
established by the EPA, and the fifth, DDT, is used by Mexico's health ministry to combat malaria. 
A similar situation prevails for a list of twenty-six voluntarily cancelled pesticides.  However, the
GAO report listed 35 pesticides for which the EPA has no established tolerances for the active
ingredients.  The problem, then, is one of potential use of chemicals actively banned for use in the
United States, potential use of chemicals about which the EPA knows too little to render a
decision on its safety, potential use of pesticides on crops other than those for which tolerances
have been established, and the potential for pesticide residue levels in excess of established
tolerances.  
These and similar issues lie behind calls for harmonization of pesticide regulations as a
condition of a comprehensive trade agreement in North America.  To be efficient, harmonization
efforts should be trilateral.  Unless a reasonable degree of confidence can be established in the
public regulatory bodies on both sides of the borders, suspicion will always remain that health and
safety regulations are being used by the U.S. and Canada as a form of protection.  In turn, U.S.
and Canadian producers will continue to suspect that less stringent laws, and evasion of those that
do exist, will give Mexico an unfair competitive edge.  With mutually accepted testing procedures
and a reasonably consistent set of standards, the emphasis can be moved away from border
inspection and the possibility of using health regulations as trade barriers will decrease.  In this
respect, the example of the EC is instructive:  the prospect of the removal of internal border posts
has forced a re-evaluation of the inspection system./CTVKP #￿ ,QJPUQP CPF #PP *KNNDGTI 5GKV\KPIGT ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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In the CUSTA trade pact, it was agreed in principle to harmonize these and other
technical standards, with the details to be worked out through a series of bilateral technical
working groups.  Expansion of the appropriate groups to include Mexico appears to be more
likely than does any more concrete agreement on standards.  However, harmonization in this area
is not easily achieved.  To some extent, national regulations on pesticide usage are a function of
climate, location of production, and importance of an individual crop in the agricultural economy. 
It is much more difficult for producers of minor or specialty crops in the U.S. to get and keep
registrations for pesticides useful in their production since the resulting sales are unlikely to be
sufficient to cover the high cost of registration.  Thus the registration "deck" is typically stacked
toward major domestic crops.  Where imports are concentrated on products which are either not
grown in significant quantities domestically or are grown under different conditions, the same
"deck" will be stacked against foreign producers.  In a trade agreement such as the proposed
NAFTA, which covers a tremendous range of latitude (from well below the Tropic of Cancer to
well above the Arctic Circle), the perceived pesticide needs of each participant country are apt to
differ considerably, making harmonization on this issue more difficult than when climates are
more nearly similar.
If pesticide harmonization took place, ignoring inspection and enforcement, the
consequences for trade flows depend on a variety of empirical matters and cannot be readily
predicted.  Johnson and Seitzinger, in a recent paper, have demonstrated that the trade flow
consequences of such harmonization between the United States and Mexico is indeterminate a
priori for particular products.   The outcome is a function of initial regulations in the two
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countries, the slopes of the two countries' supply and demand curves, and the technical efficiency
of affected versus alternative pesticides.  
At the same time that it is unclear what effects harmonization of pesticide standards will
have on trade flows, it is apparent from observers of the implementation of the U.S.-Canada trade
agreement that the elimination of costly border inspection for agrifood products is difficult even
for two countries whose domestic standards and inspection infrastructures were relatively similar
at the outset.  Some of the difficulties relate to the separation of authority between those who
negotiate trade agreements and those who mandate and enforce food safety standards.  In some
cases individual states and provinces maintain stricter standards than does the national
government, adding an additional layer of complexity.  Clearly, pesticide harmonization is an
unusually difficult task which may not be seriously tackled in the NAFTA.
b) Phytosanitary Restrictions
Pesticide regulations are not alone in their controversial nature.  Phytosanitary restrictions
imposed on imported produce are, in theory, necessary to protect domestic producers from the
introduction of unwanted, harmful pests (insects and diseases) which have a potential to cause
harm.  In this role they serve a legitimate protection function.  When they serve to keep out
imported produce which does not pose a biological threat to the domestic industry, either through
outright bans or through the imposition of prohibitive costs of eradication and documentation,9KVJ VJG TQNGU TGXGTUGF￿ VJKU KU VJG UCOG CTIWOGPV VJCV VJG 2GQRNG￿U 4GRWDNKE QH %JKPC CPF VJG 7PKVGF 5VCVGU
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they cross the line and become protectionist measures.  At times the location of that line is a
matter of opinion.
A current example of such a controversy is the United States ban on imports of Mexican
avocados due to the prevalence of several pests in Mexican producing regions which are not
present to any great extent in the avocado producing regions in the United States.  The U.S.
maintains that the restriction is justified to assure the biological viability of the domestic industry. 
Further, it is willing to certify particular growing areas for export shipments to the U.S. should
Mexico be able to demonstrate an absence of the offending pests.  Mexico, on the other hand,
feels that the ban amounts to protectionism and that imports of its avocados do not represent a
biological threat to the U.S. industry.
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The extent to which U.S. phytosanitary restrictions pose a barrier to imports of Mexican
fresh produce items varies on a product and regional basis.  Attempts to halt the spread of two
types of fruit fly results in either precertification requirements or border quarantines for produce
items coming from infested regions.  The U.S. is currently reviewing a program to protect the
domestic industry from a citrus canker after a review by USDA personnel.
c) Food Quality:  Marketing Orders
The major food quality issues are the imposition and administration of size, maturing and
grade restrictions imposed under U.S. Federal Marketing Orders.  As applied to selected fruits
and vegetables imported into the United States, these marketing orders can readily be classified as
a trade irritant.  Established under Section 8e of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937, as amended, the Orders provide for and institutionalize a form of producers' cartel.  Not
surprisingly, the program has come under fire for its possible negative consequences on consumer
welfare and as a non-tariff barrier to trade.   One of the common routes to "orderly marketing" is
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the imposition of grade, maturity and size restrictions on covered produce entering the fresh
market.  Within the United States, marketing orders are established for production within specific
geographic areas and the provisions do not apply to produce from other areas.  Given the
seasonal nature of fruit and vegetable production and the distinct varieties suited to different
growing areas which may have some overlap in harvest seasons, there is little conflict across
geographic areas within the Unied States over marketing order provisions.  However, the quality
(and certain other) restrictions of the various orders are imposed on imported produce during the
domestic marketing seasons, with mandatory border inspections conducted by the Agricultural
Marketing Service (AMS) at the exporter's expense.  The AMS has pointed out that such
standards do represent nontariff barriers to trade, but that the severity of the restriction varies.
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It can be argued that application of the provisions of marketing orders to imported produce
merely extends "national treatment" to foreign producers.  The key issue from the producer's side
is whether or not the products are differentiated in consumption by country of origin.  If not, the
imported produce receives a free ride on the backs of those covered by the order, taking
advantage of increased consumer demand, and of stable and perhaps higher prices.  Further, if
imported produce is of inferior quality but is not identified as a different product by consumers, its
inclusion can depress demand for the superior domestic product.  If, however, the product is
differentiated in consumption by country of origin, the arguments for exclusion are considerably
weakened.  Spillover effects of the demand enhancing effects of marketing orders will not be great
and the risk of harm to domestic producers from the presence of an inferior product on the market
would be limited.
Where the product itself is different in its physical attributes, it is difficult to argue
convincingly that imposition of U.S. marketing order standards to imports are anything other than
protectionism.  Under such circumstances consumers have reduced access to different varieties of
produce, foreign producers suffer restricted access to the U.S. market, and domestic producers
stand to gain monopoly rents.
An aspect of certain marketing orders which has been cited as being particularly
objectionable by Mexican exporters is that of standards which vary from year to year, or within
the year, depending on supply and demand balances.  In such cases the foreign producer is not
able to gear production practices to meet a known set of criteria for seasonal shipments.  The
heightened uncertainty regarding export market conditions negatively affects expected returns and
thus can be expected to dampen export supply to the U.S. market.  Produce failing to meet the
standards is turned back at the border.
Runsten has suggested that one solution to the marketing order problem for fresh fruits
and vegetables in the context of a NAFTA is to mandate representation on the marketing order
boards from competing producers in Mexico and Canada, as applicable.   Such representation
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would allow input into the decisions affecting the marketing of certain Mexican and Canadian
produce in the United States.  Some other possibilities include recognition of parallel marketing
organizations in the partner countries, and allowing them to set up their own quality standards;
allowing for exclusion from the provisions if the produce or its packaging is marked with country
of origin; or to extend true national treatment by requiring approval by a two-thirds majority vote
of producers in both (or all) countries whose products are to be covered under a marketing order
in order for it to be put into effect.  A more direct, if contentious, solution to this problem is to
phase out these orders altogether.V.  FOOD PROCESSING
1. The Issues
The food processing component of the food system is usually given less attention than the
farm sector in domestic and trade policy discussions, but it is too important to neglect in a
NAFTA.  The reasons for its importance are that it generally contributes as much to GDP as does
the farm sector, it accounts for a considerable amount of employment, and its economic health
affects both food consumers and producers in terms of prices paid and the competitiveness (or
existence) of the local industry.
Typically, food processing in the U.S. and Canada is protected by tariffs on food products. 
One of the main issues in negotiating NAFTA provisions in this area is the potential of the U.S.
and Canadian processing sectors to adjust to reductions in these tariffs.  The fears expressed are
the same as those expressed in parts of the manufacturing sector:  due to lower wage rates and
environmental standards, Mexican food processing firms will expand at the expense of their
counterparts in the U.S. and Canada.  Food firms in Canada and the U.S. will relocate to Mexico
or be forced to close, resulting in the loss to existing firms of jobs and profitability.  Similar fears
were expressed in Canada in the debate surrounding the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement
(CUSTA), where it was predicted that Canadian jobs and production would be lost to the U.S.  In
some cases, the opening up of Mexican borders to food products is seen as a potentially profitable
opportunity to increase exports.  But many public statements in the U.S. and most in Canada
argue that a NAFTA will on balance harm the domestic food processing industries in terms of
production, jobs and profitability through shifts of production to Mexico, the losses of which are
claimed to outweigh any gains from increased Mexican demand.
2. Economics of Reduced Border Protection of Domestic Food Processing
Many of the arguments noted above reflect the perceptions of firms that believe
themselves to be threatened by a NAFTA and hence wish to maintain current protection or seek
adjustment assistance from governments.  How much of this is public posturing and how much is
accurate is unclear, and requires detailed analyses of the specific situations.
There are, however, some general observations which can be made.  The food processing
sector exhibits some characteristics both of "footloose" manufacturing industries, searching for
low-cost labour and less-restrictive environmental regulations, and of resource-based industries
that are tied to the source of the raw material.  The likely result of reduced protection depends in
part on whether the particular industry is closer to the manufacturing or the resource-based
industry model.  The food industry in the U.S. and Canada has an interest in seeing healthy
growth in its domestic agriculture, but important parts of it, particularly larger food firms, are also
able to switch some operations to other countries to source raw products.  Therefore, the food
sector in the U.S. and Canada has the potential to benefit from any trade-related expansion in
Mexican food demand, either through greater exports or through foreign investment.  The2GVGT #￿ .WU\VKI ￿￿￿￿￿￿ CPF 6￿ *C\NGFKPG CPF 4￿ 2KRGU ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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Mexican food industry itself will face some export opportunities but will also be under pressure to
modernize and upgrade its facilities, presumably benefitting from capital investment from the U.S.
to undertake these improvements.  These trends are already evident in advance of the NAFTA,
notably in the fruit and vegetable sector.
The location decision of a food processing plant depends partly on the relative costs in
each location.  Lower input prices in Mexico, such as for low-skilled labour, will reduce costs, but
this may not be decisive for changing plant location decisions.  First, it depends upon whether
there are productivity or input quality differences which offset the apparent lower unit costs in
Mexico.  For example, labor productivity or raw material conversion rates may be sufficiently
higher in the U.S. and Canada to offset any lower Mexican wage rates.  Second, it depends upon
whether the cost share for this input is large or small, and upon the ease with which U.S. or
Canadian firms can substitute other inputs like capital for their more expensive labour, either with
existing plants or with a new technology.  Third, it depends upon the transportation costs of
shipping the raw materials to a plant site in relation to the transport costs of shipping the final
product.  Fourth, there may be the prospect of expanding the scale of operations by selling into
the larger North American market, reducing unit costs due to scale economies.
Plant location decisions also depend upon demand-side considerations, such as product
choice and marketing strategies.  One aspect of a marketing strategy is whether a firm should
undertake high volume "commodity" selling or sell at lower volume and higher quality into so-
called niche markets.  The production of higher value-added foods, such as those with more
convenience characteristics, will reduce the direct competition with Mexican products (lowering
the own-price demand elasticity) and lower the cost share of labour.  Differentiating one's product
through higher quality (which may raise the raw material quality requirements, involve a different
technology, and increase the required skill level of labour employed) and building a reputation
(e.g., branding at the firm or regional level, as discussed below) also reduces direct competition
and permits higher revenues.  Empirical studies of fruit and vegetable processors in British
Columbia suggest that the potential gains in revenues from adopting such market strategies
outweigh by some margin the potential cost savings of using more efficient plants or processes.  
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In the context of NAFTA, food firms that adopt these marketing strategies will be less affected by
any reduction in their border protection.
This suggests that import-competing food firms have a large number of means of adjusting
to increased Mexican competition, besides closing down operations or relocating plants to
Mexico.  It also indicates that with such a range of possible adjustments, predicting the effects of
freer trade on food firms is dependent upon case-by-case circumstances.  There are also likely to
be food firms that will be able to increase their exports to Mexico following relaxation of Mexican
trade barriers, with the additional possible advantage of achieving lower costs in cases where scale
economies exist.  Clearly, public predictions of U.S. or Canadian food industry collapse due to a
NAFTA are both overly pessimistic and little more than guesswork.  3. Underlying Economic Trends in Location of the Food Industry
In anticipating the effects of a NAFTA on food processing, it is necessary to distinguish
between those changes that are due to NAFTA and those that are occurring independently.  A
review of recent developments in the North American food processing sector reveals already
many of the concerns attributed to a NAFTA.  A number of the larger food industry firms have
been locating particular operations in lower cost locations in various countries, including Mexico,
for more than a decade.  Among the larger U.S. firms, BirdsEye moved some vegetable freezing
and canning operations to Mexico as early as the late 1960s, followed by Green Giant, Campbell's
Soup and Hunt.  In fact, these early operations are credited with beginning the growth of Mexican
skills and comparative advantage in the processed vegetable industry.
Marketing strategies likewise are changing with the increased competitiveness of new
imports from offshore locations, notably in the fruit and vegetable sector.  Successful firms are
developing distinctive, often higher quality, products to exploit smaller volume market niches and
in other cases are attempting to preserve their uniqueness with brand name investments.  This
extends to fresh fruits, although there is debate about whether branding is profitable for
vegetables.  Brand names may be firm-specific and signal consistently high quality.  Sunkist and
Chiquita are pioneering brand names for fruit, and more recently many Washington State apple
packing houses receive premium prices for their own "branded" apples.  In other cases, these
brands may be country-specific and based upon unique, fresh tastes, such as is the case with new
apple varieties being sold by New Zealand.  Firms selling unbranded or "ordinary" fruits and
vegetables face increased competition from offshore suppliers and discounted prices from
wholesalers and retailers who buy generic food products to sell at volume.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that tariffs are not the only factor which may affect
competitiveness in food markets.  The effect of a NAFTA may be of secondary importance
compared to other factors.  Among the other factors which have emerged as being very important
in recent years are perceived levels of food safety, and increased demands for food which is
nutritious.  The market gains to those food products which are judged to be safer and more
nutritious are likely to exceed any losses from tariff reductions.  Another issue affecting
competitiveness has been identified recently in the Canadian fruit and vegetable sector, and this is
a non-tariff trade barrier embedded in Canada's standards and labelling legislation (the Canadian
Agricultural Products (CAP) Act).  This Act effectively prohibits the importation of fresh product
in bulk unless imports are deemed necessary to prevent a physical shortage of domestic
production, a judgement made largely by the boards or agencies selling the fresh product.  At
present this restriction is a major disadvantage facing fruit processors, where the added costs of
supply and domestic price uncertainty may dwarf the impact of removing food product tariffs.
4. Dynamic Aspects of Trade Agreements with Mexico
In anticipating the outcomes of freer trade in food products with Mexico, the dynamics of
the Mexican supply side must be considered in the context of more open trade in all goods.  In the
case of food processing this includes at least four topics, the available supply of raw product, the4WPUVGP￿ QR EKV￿
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raw product supply elasticity, changes in technology, and changes in the Mexican wage rate. 
However, this list emphasizes the close relationship between the fresh and processed market in
fruits and vegetables, and most of these four topics apply as well to the fresh market.  In all four
areas there are potential constraints to food product supplies from Mexico which may reduce
current Mexican raw product cost advantages, or which at least suggest that there is a great deal
of uncertainty facing would-be domestic and foreign investors in Mexican food processing.
First, the raw food product supply to processing is very dependent upon the Mexican fresh
market supply, making the food product supplies a small and variable residual in some cases. 
Runsten has pointed out that for many fresh produce items exports account for a relatively small
fraction of Mexico's production.   Even for tomatoes, by far the most important horticultural
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export to the U.S., only one-third of annual production is typically exported.  Some notable
exceptions to this general rule are a few items whose production is the result of export markets: 
cucumbers, broccoli, asparagus and zucchini squash.  With the exception of cucumbers, even the
export oriented products can be sold on the fresh market or for processing, depending on market
conditions.  Further, as Mexican incomes grow due to ongoing economic reform and perhaps due
to NAFTA, we can anticipate increased demand for fresh fruit and vegetables.  The result would
be reduced raw product supplies to processing or increases in the prices of raw product supplies.
Second, the ease with which further raw fruit and vegetable supplies may be obtained (i.e.,
the supply elasticity) may be low in some cases due to limited land supplies, competition from
other crops, insufficient irrigation water, or a lack of appropriate infrastructure.  This implies that
the potential market supply of Mexican processed foods may be limited in some cases.
On the fresh side, we should also expect an upward sloping short run supply curve for
most fresh produce items imported from Mexico as a function of alternative destinations for the
product.  One implication is that we should expect that prices will not fall by the full amount of
the tariffs as (and if) they are eliminated.  To what extent the export supply curve for fruit and
vegetables will increase (shift right) depends upon not only infrastructure, but also on the extent
of trade liberalization in cereals, which could increase land supplies available for vegetables, and
foreign investment.  
Third, current raw product cost differences favouring Mexico may be overcome by new
technical developments in yields and other input savings in the U.S. or Canada, reducing or even
reversing the comparative advantage between Mexico and the U.S. or Canada.  A striking
example of this factor at work is given in Runsten and Archibald.   The frozen strawberry
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industry is very labour-intensive, favouring Mexico, yet agricultural research has improved yields
so much in California that the U.S. industry has flourished and even increased its market share. 
Frozen broccoli, on the other hand, has moved significantly to Mexico.  Although less labour-
intensive, the technology of growing broccoli in Mexico and California is very similar and the
lower labour costs in Mexico have been enough to give Mexican broccoli processors a landedcost advantage.  Fourth, labour costs in Mexico can be expected to rise with their economic
growth.  This may erode their cost advantage unless productivity differences increase sufficiently. 
Then, as Mexican wages rise, those industries with a widely applicable technology are likely to
move further south to lower wage countries such as those of Central and South America.  This
illustrates again the importance of improvements in and transferability of farm production and
processing technology in determining cost advantages.
5. Implications for NAFTA
On the basis of this review of the food processing sector, particularly in fruits and
vegetables, there emerge several conclusions of relevance to the NAFTA negotiations.  First,
overall predictions of the net effect of NAFTA on food processing are almost impossible to make,
other than the rather general comment that, holding everything else constant, the more labour-
intensive operations will move to Mexico to take advantage of Mexico's lower wage rates.  Many
factors other than labour that differ between Mexico and the U.S. or Canada have important
consequences for processing plant location decisions, so that commodity or regional predictions
are not possible without access to detailed data.  Some operations will move to Mexico, but these
cases are not easily predictable in advance.  In other words, it is very difficult to determine how
many food firms and processed commodities fall into the category of very mobile or "footloose"
manufacturing and how many are more resource-based and dependent upon locating near
particular raw material supplies.  There are many adjustments possible for those Canadian and
U.S. processors facing increased competition from Mexico, on both the technology and marketing
fronts.  Through product differentiation, improved quality and building a reputation, the
marketing side appears to be a particularly effective means increasing revenue and staying
competitive.  Therefore, one can be advised to put little weight on most of the rhetoric coming
from narrowly focused interest groups, especially the predictions of economic ruin due to a
NAFTA.
The second point to make is that many of the adjustments, gains or losses, attributed to a
NAFTA will occur anyway.  In other words, in the context of the changes in competitiveness and
technology which are already encouraging many operations to move between the U.S. and
Mexico independent of any trade agreement, the net effects of a NAFTA itself on this sector are
not likely to be large.
The third point which is made clear by reviewing comparative advantage of food
processing is that this is very much a whole industry issue.  One cannot negotiate or analyze the
effects of trade policy changes at only one level, such as the farm or the processors in isolation. 
Farm product prices are often a major element of processor costs, hence affecting competitiveness
and plant location decisions, and must be kept in mind when analyzing processor response to
reduced protection.  These matters are especially clear in the case of the Canadian dairy industry
and the CUSTA, where farm protection was left in place, yet processor tariff protection would
decline and import quotas (at least ex post) could not be used.  In removing food product
protection, processors can be made uncompetitive or pushed into relocating to a country with
lower raw material prices if protection for farmers is maintained by keeping raw product prices
high or by keeping non-tariff restrictions like Canada's CAP Act in place.VI.  LINKAGES BETWEEN NAFTA, CUSTA, AND THE GATT
1. Introduction
The progress towards free trade in agricultural products can best be described as glacial. 
The situation changes at a speed so slow that the observer may think there is no movement at all. 
But, as with a glacier, there is an underlying flow so inexorable that it is hard to think of the trend
being soon reversed.  This slow-but-sure advance towards trade liberalization in agricultural
markets can be seen, with varying clarity, on several fronts.  The most obvious of these is the
negotiations in the GATT Uruguay Round, where only the crucial final steps remain to be taken
on the road to an agreement.  The elements are coming into place for a far-reaching pact which
will transform the way that agricultural trade is governed in the multilateral trade system. 
Negotiators could snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, but there is still the possibility of a
completion of the Round within the next few months. 
Despite the attention it has captured, the GATT negotiation is by no means the only place
where movement towards more liberal trade is being pursued.  Indeed, regional and unilateral
policy discussions are in some respects ahead of the multilateral talks.  Regional trade
negotiations, besides the talks designed to lead to a NAFTA, are also moving little by little
towards the goal of agricultural markets trade less encumbered by national farm support systems. 
Trade agreements between the EC and the countries in Eastern Europe are forcing somewhat
reluctant progress in this direction.  But as significant as these intergovernmental negotiations are,
some of the most important developments are the domestic (unilateral) changes now underway. 
Several countries in Latin America, together with some in non-EC Europe and a few in Asia, are
in the process of modifying their domestic agricultural policies.  In many cases this reform is
making them less obtrusive to international trade.  
A number of the ideas discussed in the agricultural negotiations in the GATT round are
already finding their way into national policies in advance of multilateral action.  Chief among
these is the use of tariffs in place of the mix of non-tariff import measures previously employed. 
Domestic market interventions are being replaced, in an attempt to promote efficient use of
agricultural resources.  The need to align agricultural policies with reformed economic systems is
apparently sufficiently urgent in these countries that it cannot wait until the U.S. and the EC get
their agricultural ducks in line.  The Uruguay Round, for these countries, will follow and underpin
domestic changes, rather than force those policy adjustments upon the domestic scene.
The direction in which agricultural policy is headed is almost independent of the forum in
which the policy changes are discussed.  This encouraging conclusion should be tempered with
the realization that the forces against change are still dominant in the richest countries; that there
is a "new agenda" of related health and environmental issues that could interfere with progress in
trade talks; and that such events as a crop shortage could easily derail the process of both
domestic and trade reform.2. Links with the GATT
It is clear that many items on the agenda for the NAFTA talks overlap with the GATT
negotiations, while others are the subject of domestic debate unconnected with trade policy.  The
GATT round is the primary focus at the moment for international talks on the conduct of
agricultural trade.  Although it is hazardous to speculate on the outcome of the current GATT
talks, or even when they might finish, it is worth reviewing the agenda for those negotiations.
a) The GATT Agenda
The Uruguay Round was launched in 1986 with the firm intention to bring agriculture
more nearly into line with the manufacturing sectors in terms of trade rules and policies.  This
entailed for the first time negotiating on domestic agricultural support policies.  Clearly the details
of these policies themselves were not suitable for multilateral negotiation.  The issue was how to
negotiate on these policies without running headlong into the domestic political nexus that
determines such programs.  Two options emerged: one was to negotiate on an aggregate measure
of support (AMS) as a proxy for these policies, and the other was to set out rules within the
GATT that would effectively constrain domestic policy choice.  
The story of the nearly five years of negotiations is one of wavering between these options
on the part of the EC and the U.S.  The U.S. started as the champion of the "aggregate measure"
approach, with countries choosing their own path to salvation.  By the end of 1988, the U.S. had
backed off this AMS approach, and introduced the notion of negotiating on specific policy types,
notably the conversion of non-tariff import barriers to tariffs, the banning of export subsidies, and
the categorization of domestic subsidies by degrees of trade distortion.  Trade rules were to be the
main line of attack on domestic policies, albeit with a schedule for support reduction.  The EC
initially wanted negotiations to focus on ways to increase world commodity prices, but they
warmed to the idea of steady reductions in support levels and became the champions of the AMS
approach.  The issue as to how to negotiate was still unresolved at the "final" meeting in Brussels
in December 1990.  Most of the four years set aside for negotiations had thus been taken up in
procedural discussion.  The issue was finally settled in February 1991, when the EC agreed to the
approach of the U.S.
   A final compromise is now in sight which would establish new rules and also reduce the
protective effect of some existing policies through a scaling back of support.  If an agreement is
reached, import barriers will be changed to tariffs, though with some safeguards against sudden
world price changes or surges in imports; export subsidies will be conrolled and scaled down,
though not banned; domestic support measures will be classified as "amber" or "green" depending
upon their trade-distorting nature, with a scaling back of the amber-box measures.  A new accord
on health and phytosanitary trade restrictions is ready for inclusion in the GATT package, which
would improve the transparency of national regulations in this area and make the settlement of
disputes easier.  Though there still needs to be a considerable act of political will to get agreement
in the next few months, the technical aspects of such a deal are in place.The significance of such a deal for regional free-trade talks, such as the NAFTA
discussions, is that it addresses the same set of issues, namely the distortive impact on trade flows
of instruments designed for domestic farm price support.  Within a free-trade area, as in global
trade, export subsidies pose particular problems.  If one bans such subsidies on intra-bloc trade,
then high-cost producers will lose markets: if one allows them to stay then the importers will cry
unfair competition.  And if only one partner has export subsidies on trade with the outside world
then trade deflection will cause that program to be more expensive.  Non-tariff import barriers
suffer from the same problems.  If one country has a quota on imports, then it can maintain that
restriction either by imposing quantitative limits on intra-bloc trade or by "globalizing" the quota. 
If one country has a variable levy system in place, to protect a fixed internal price, then there has
to be either a similar type of conditional protection on intra-trade or face the consequences of
unstable prices.  If, for instance, the partner has tariff-type protection, then at times of low prices
the price level on intra-trade will reflect this lower price, undercutting the domestic guarantee.  If
a country is running a production or marketing quota system, the existence of free intra-bloc trade
again implies either negotiating an "exception" for that commodity or a introducing a bloc-wide
quota system.
The currently proposed GATT solution would make life a whole lot easier for free-trade
areas.  Moving to tariffs as the main import barrier makes the issue of freer internal trade much
more tractable.  Of course there will still be losers from internal trade liberalization, but a long
transition period with safeguards can always be negotiated if necessary.  A global agreement to
phase down export subsidies immediately takes the pressure from the need to negotiate on these
matters regionally.  And a series of GATT-acceptable decoupled payments in lieu of present high
price supports gives a neat way to avoid the issue of different support prices within regional trade
blocs.  The payment of such trade-neutral subsidies could be allowed to continue on a national
basis, to reflect the "divergent social economic and environmental conditions" among the
members of the free-trade area.  At the risk of overstating the point, the GATT formula of tariffs
and decoupled payments is about the only way (short of total liberalization) to make agricultural
policies consistent with the development of regional trade blocs without common policies.
b) Timing Issues
The timing of an agreement in the parallel discussions in the Uruguay Round on new rules
to govern agricultural trade in the GATT is however crucial to the NAFTA talks.  Many of the
objectives of freer North American trade in agricultural products would have been assisted by a
more speedy resolution of the GATT talks.  But the U.S., Canada and Mexico have had to
proceed without the certainty of a firm GATT pact.  This uncertainty translates into a shifting
agenda for the NAFTA talks, and changes the probabilities of the outcomes described above.
A favorable outcome to the GATT Round would doubtless provide some momentum for a
more ambitious NAFTA.  Under these conditions, plans for sectoral integration would appear to
be more realistic.  A good GATT outcome on agriculture that included a commitment for steady
reductions of support levels, combined with a movement towards tariffs for import protection and
the elimination of export subsidies, would make the integration of North American agriculturalmarkets much easier.  Mexico could continue to "tariffy" its import regime under the GATT
agreement, avoiding the impression of being forced to do so by the U.S.; the U.S. could drop its
export subsidies on farm products to Mexico, thus reducing the potential for market disruption
without appearing to be acting to reduce trade.  If the GATT pact included minimum access
guarantees, new trade opportunities in all three countries would be opened up.  Making domestic
price support policies less trade distorting, through the traffic-light system, would reduce regional
as well as global trade tensions.  And as support levels came down over a transition period, a raft
of smaller trade problems would be eased.
A weak GATT outcome could signal a more limited approach to regional problems.  A
"modest" NAFTA, with an emphasis on solving bilateral problems, requires little in the way of a
successful GATT Round outcome or any further degree of liberalization on the domestic front. 
Indeed, outright failure in the GATT could cause a burst of enthusiasm for bilateral and regional
trade processes, and might seem to make a more ambitious NAFTA possible.  But such an
outcome, even though it might give a rhetorical boost to regional ideas, will pose significant
additional problems for agriculture in the NAFTA talks.  In effect, all the desirable developments
under discussion in Geneva would have to be translated to the NAFTA agenda.  Though it might
seem to be much easier to find common ground on farm trade policy improvements among the
U.S., Canada and Mexico - in particular now that Mexico broadly supports the GATT position of
the Cairns Group - than with the EC and Japan, it is not clear that this could easily be put into a
NAFTA agreement.  Objectives that look desirable at a multilateral level may lose some appeal on
a regional basis.  Without the promise of higher sales to Japan and the EC, the U.S. and Canada
may rapidly lose enthusiasm for tariffication and export subsidy reductions in the more limited
context of regional trade. 
This leads to the conclusion that a successful outcome to the GATT talks is probably a
prerequisite for any serious moves towards a true common market in North American agriculture. 
A strong GATT agreement promising real and sustained agricultural trade liberalization at a
multilateral level could also be a springboard for further cooperation in policy making at a
regional level.  
3. Policy Changes in Other Regions
In addition to the NAFTA, the EC/EFTA and the GATT negotiations, a further set of
discussions of an internal nature is reshaping domestic agricultural policies in a wide variety of
countries.  The process which has become known as "agricultural policy reform" is at one level
more fundamental than the trade talks.  In many instances, the entire role of the state in
agricultural markets is being reassessed.  The related policies in the area of rural incomes, farm
structure and food security are also under intensive review.  
Among the common themes of this review are the widespread switch to tariffs,
particularily notable among the countries of Central and South America, as a replacement for both
quantitative import controls and domestic market support systems.  Tariffs are both more
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opportunities for bureaucratic distortions to trade patterns.  Coupled with regional trade
agreements which include tariff reductions, this switch to tariffs limits the scope for rent-seeking
activities.  The fact that it is also consonent with the thrust of the GATT discussions is a bonus. 
One of the first countries to liberalize in the area of foreign trade was Chile, which
experimented with a liberal trade in the 1970s, retreated somewhat with the crisis in the early
1980s, and then moved back towards low tariffs in the past few years.   Agriculture is protected
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by a uniform tariff of 11 percent.   Bolivia tried a rapid liberalization of trade in 1985, replacing
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its protective policies with a uniform tariff of 20 percent.  Jamaica and Mexico also changed
policies in a dramatic fashion, while Colombia, Venezuela and the countries of the Central
American Common Market moved more slowly.  Peru was one of the few countries in the region
to be left behind in this process, though both Argentina and Brazil moved more hesitantly than
most.  Brazil should have reduced its agricultural tariffs to an average of 20 percent within the
next three years, though it retains import licenses: Argentina has recently moved to modest tariff
levels, phased out its licensing system, and removed the long-standing taxes on exports.
Regional trade arrangements have done little to spur this trade liberalization in Latin
America.  Though regional free trade blocs have existed for some time, their force as determinants
of trade policy has been limited.  For most countries in Latin America, access to the U.S. market
is the key to trade policy, in agriculture as in other commodities, and trade relations with the U.S.
are the main "regional" focus.   The proposal of the Bush administration, in June 1990, for an
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Enterprise of the Americas Initiative (EAI), to be a framework for separate agreements on trade,
investment and debt reduction, recognizes these bilateral concerns.  Individual countries have
been negotiating trade agreements with the U.S. under the EAI umbrella, and the first investment
treaty has been signed with 
Argentina.  
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Eastern European countries are also undergoing radical changes in their trade policies, as
a part of their change in economic system.  Under a system of central planning, tariff rates are
implicit and are often very high.  Moving to free trade poses significant problems, in particular in
the absence of currency convertability.   Those countries that moved quickly to liberal trade
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sectors of the economy before resources have had time to adjust.  In agriculture this has led to the
anomaly of upward adjustments in tariffs, in both Poland and Czechoslovakia, in an attempt to
provide some protection to an exposed agricultural sector.  In this connection, the discussions
with the EC and the outcome of the GATT Round will have a major impact on whether these
countries build up their agricultural sectors behind a protective wall or allow them to adjust to
genuine market demand.
The movement towards more open agricultural trade seems less apparent in Asia, where
several authors have pointed to a tendency for protection to rise with income levels.   Japan has
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converted several of its quantitative restrictions on farm imports to tariffs (at the insistence of the
U.S.), has lowered its protection levels somewhat in recent years, and is apparently ready to cut a
deal on the thorny issue of rice imports to avoid further delays in the Uruguay Round.  But South
Korea has taken over the role of vocal opponent to any comprehensive tariffication of agricultural
import policies.  Other countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines seem willing to
follow the example set by Japan, Korea and Taiwan towards a highly protected sector for
domestic food crops, producing at a huge loss when valued at world prices.   For Asia, the
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GATT Round will need to impose more liberal trade rules for agriculture on an unresponsive
domestic political system.   The lack of any agreed regional free-trade agreement (other than the
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ASEAN pact) precludes at present a convincing regional road to trade liberalization.  And even if
such a trade body was to emerge, it is difficult to see it tackling the problems of agricultural trade
in a vigorous way.
Among the industrial countries, two countries stand out as having moved most rapidly to
remove trade barriers and to reduce market-distorting domestic policies.  The pace was set by
New Zealand, which started in 1985 to unravel all its market price support policies.  Australia
followed somewhat later, and the two neighbors share the distinction of the lowest rates of
support among OECD countries.   Moreover, under the terms of the Australia-New Zealand
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Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER), which started in 1983, trade between these
countries has been liberalised.  The last remaining border restrictions on bilateral trade were
removed in 1990.  
One could make a case that regional trade initiatives at the very least soften some of the
blow of opening up markets to global competition.  Groups that argue that the world market is anunreliable provider of food and fiber imports have less credibility when the supplies come from a
close neighbor and intimate trading partner.  This may explain why unilateral liberalisation seems
to go along with willingness to participate in regional trade blocs.  Recent changes in Mexico,
Canada and Sweden provide examples of domestic policy developments that have been taking
place in countries that are also negotiating regional trade agreements.  Each of these examples
shows that the prime determinant of movement towards trade liberalization is a change in
domestic policy views or priorities: how that reform is dovetailed in with bilateral and multilateral
talks is a secondary issue.  
4. Conclusions
High hopes have been pinned on the outcome of the Uruguay Round.  The benefits of
concluding the Round with an agreement which anchors domestic farm policies to enforceable
trade rules are significant.  But, as important, the types of rules and the policy changes that they
promote can also have a profound impact.  In a situation of tariffs-plus-targeted-payments,
negotiation of sensible, non-trade-diverting arrangements for liberalization within blocs would be
made much easier.  It is clear that the economic transformation of Eastern Europe needs the basis
of a predictable international trade system for agriculture.  The GATT Round could provide such
a framework.  Developing countries are rushing headlong into strategies of deregulation,
privatization and market liberalization.  If the agricultural sector in these countries is not to
become as distorted as in the industrial nations, these governments need the security of an open
and transparent market for both imports and exports of agricultural products.  Many countries are
moving in the direction of less distorting policies in advance of a GATT agreement.  These
countries too need the backstop of new GATT rules both to prevent backsliding and to lower the
political cost of their actions.
If the negotiators cannot come up with an agreement then the regional, bilateral and
unilateral movements toward freer agricultural markets will be dealt a blow.  How severe a
setback may not be evident for some time.  It is not immediately clear that the regional process
can take up the slack.  Agricultural trade negotiations within NAFTA, or even within a broader
Americas FTA, would have few of the features of the GATT Round.  The prize of better access
to EC and Japanese markets would not be there.  The prospect of developing a subsidy-free world
market into which small exporters could sell without fear of being displaced by the subsidised
exports of the larger countries would be lost.  Regional trade patterns in agriculture make it
unlikely that any significant amount of the present trading problems could be handled within a
bloc.  Nevertheless, there could be a role for regional trade policies in the area of agriculture. 
This depends on the willingness of countries to develop a constructive approach to sectoral
integration within the regional bloc.  If national policies can be adapted to allow for regional free
trade, by moving away from quantitative restrictions, export subsidies and other market-disruptive
instruments, then the prospect exists of a set of rules for inter-bloc trade which may be more
liberal than at present.  VII.  NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION:  LESSONS FROM
THE CANADA-U.S. TRADE AGREEMENT
1. Negotiations
The recently-negotiated Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement (CUSTA) may offer some lessons
for a NAFTA, both in terms of negotiation and implementation issues.  Because the negotiation
experience is still fresh in the minds of trade officials, it will no doubt influence the conduct of
current NAFTA talks.  For this reason, it is useful to review the treatment of agriculture within
the U.S.-Canada pact to extract the lessons it may offer.
It was suggested earlier that agricultural trade liberalization was not a major focus of the
CUSTA.  At least three reasons can be advanced to explain this omission.  First, as major
exporters, neither Canada nor the U.S. think of the other as a large potential market for future
sales.  In spite of considerable trade in U.S. fruits and vegetables exported to Canada and in
Canadian livestock products moving to the U.S., the main export possibilities are perceived to be
elsewhere.  Many import restrictions in the two countries are in place to protect against dumping
or to support some domestic program of market regulation or supply control.  The blatant
protection of an inefficient domestic sector, as illustrated by the farm policies of Japan and the
European Community, is less common in the U.S. and Canada, though the dairy and sugar sectors
stand out as exceptions.
Allied to this was the fact that agricultural policy and trade issues were a major focus of
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.  At the time of the CUSTA negotiations there was still
hope that the Uruguay Round would severely curb agricultural protection and impose new rules
on global agricultural trade.  This made the task of negotiating bilateral rules both less urgent and
more complicated: it seemed obvious that such matters were best left to the GATT talks.
Another reason lay just below the surface.  In Canada, many of the agricultural trade
regulations are legislated and administered at the Provincial level.  The federal government runs
its own set of farm programs often in parallel with those of the provinces.  The CUSTA was
negotiated at the federal level and did not directly involve negotiation on provincial legislation: the
federal government was assumed to be able to bring the provinces into line at the implementation
stage.  This assumption may not in all cases be warranted.  Not only have provinces been able to
resist the pressure from Ottawa to make changes consistent with the CUSTA, there has been
evidence of some new initiatives at the provincial level to replace federal protection given up in
the bilateral agreement.
The low priority accorded agriculture in CUSTA suggests that it may not be a particularly
good model for NAFTA.  On the other hand, many of the same issues will arise again in the
NAFTA context, and thus the applicability of the solutions is of interest.   CUSTA dealt with
tariff reductions in agriculture in the same way as in industry, with a transition period to full
elimination.  This was weakened however with a snapback provision, which has been invoked by
Canada on several occasions, to allow existing tariffs to be reinstated for a temporary period. 
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liberalization of agricultural markets, it is still not necessarily the most appropriate device for
granting importer safeguards.  CUSTA was on surer ground when it banned the use of export
subsidies in the partner country market, together with a promise to take into account the partners
interests in third markets.  Unfortunately, a sizable share of the present shipments of U.S. farm
goods to Mexico benefit from either direct export assistance or more often from export credit
schemes which have a similar effect.  It is not clear that the Mexican government would wish to
give up such transfers of purchasing power.  More likely to be translatable to a NAFTA is the
operation of Technical Working Groups, whose task it is to look at problems of technical
regulations and standards.  Such groups existed before CUSTA, and indeed have been set up on a
bilateral basis as a part of the evolving U.S.-Mexico sectoral talks.  But a generalization of these
technical groups would make it easier to come to grips with the many problems in this area.
One innovation in CUSTA that might have value in a NAFTA is the mechanism for
removing import licenses on grain, as employed by the Canadian government.  The novelty was to
use as a trigger the level of support in the two countries.  If the level of support (as calculated by
a Producer Subsidy Equivalent, or PSE) is higher in the U.S. then Canada can retain its import
controls.  Once the U.S. PSE falls below that in Canada, as it now has for oats and wheat, then
the import restriction is removed.  In principle this means essentially free trade in grains across the
U.S./Canada border: in practice, the Canadian Wheat Board can probably modify its own pricing
system to avoid significant flows of grain into Canadian markets.  The implication for trade policy
of such a mechanism is significant.  Normally, one would expect quantitative trade barriers to be
used when that country has a higher level of protection than its trading partners.  That would be
the rationale for such protection, and serve to keep domestic price policies apart from the
pressures of intra-bloc trade.  But the PSE test in Article 705 operates in the opposite way. 
Import protection through quantitative restrictions is not allowed when that country has a higher
level of support than the other countries.  High support prices become vulnerable because they
cannot have the backing of quantitative import restrictions.  This technique for ensuring that
domestic and trade policies are consistent could be worth exploring in the context of a NAFTA.
One complication that has arisen in the CUSTA treatment of agriculture is the apparent
lack of consideration (however understandable) of how possible GATT changes would interact
with CUSTA provisions.  The case in point is the dairy industry, where the CUSTA introduced no
direct changes at the farm level.   However, a possible outcome of the Uruguay Round would
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require Canada to tariffy the protection of raw milk implicit in its system of supply management. 
If this were to happen, how would the CUSTA treat such a newly-introduced tariff?  Would this
tariff be phased out entirely over ten years, like other tariffs existing when CUSTA was signed, or
would GATT-negotiated tariff schedules be applied.  This points to the issue of maintaining consistency with possible GATT changes as well as existing articles in the negotiation of a
NAFTA.
The issue that most distinguishes a NAFTA from the U.S.-Canadian bilateral agreement,
and indeed from the European experience with EFTA, is the lower level of income in Mexico
relative to the other participating countries.  The EC has had some experience of establishing free
trade between high and middle income countries, with the accession of Portugal in 1986, and the
unification of Germany in 1990.  However in both cases (and indeed in the case of the original
membership of Portugal in EFTA) trade liberalization has been accompanied by significant
transfers from the richer countries.  Conventional wisdom used to caution that such trade
agreements were likely to be hazardous to the health of the low-income partner -- an economy
had to reach a particular level of development before it could face unbridled international
competition.  More recently, this proposition has been stood on its head.  Industries must be
competitive to contribute to development.  Sheltering such industries delays the restructuring of
the economy that is necessary to take advantage of global markets as both buyers and sellers.  As
a consequence of this change of attitude, the lower level of economic development in Mexico
tends to be seen as a reason for liberalizing trade rather than an impediment to such liberalization.
2. Implementation
The implementation of any policy change, particularly in trade policy, has a major effect
on the results of that policy change, such that often one cannot interpret policy provisions at their
face value.  Yet too often in analyses of trade policies these issues of implementation are
neglected.  We will discuss first some general issues of where implementation can be more
difficult or incomplete, and follow this with some observations of the early implementation
experience of the CUSTA.
One important implementation issue is to distinguish between control over border policies,
which typically resides with the central or federal government, and control over other market
policies and regulations which often reside with provincial, state, or local governments.  The point
is that the ability of the central government to ensure compliance with trade policies is limited by
its control over commerce, and provincial or state autonomy and jurisdiction is often important
enough to frustrate federal government intentions.  This has two sides.  In those cases where
limits to trade are provincial or state-determined, extending national treatment to imports is not
very meaningful.  Alternatively, local government may have both the policy means and the
political motive to find ways to protect local producers in the face of national trade liberalization.
A second general observation is that in those industries with a high degree of existing
protection, one is more apt to find the erection of new trade barriers by industry members or
government bodies, frustrating national trade liberalization measures.  The political economy
factors which generated the initial border protection (or moved in a trade agreement) are likely to
find expression in a demand for alternative trade barriers or prompt another level of government
to provide them.  If the protected firm or industry had previously anticipated such changes or had
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protection.  These may be in the form of protective local government regulations, as discussed
above, or market barriers such as control over the wholesale or retail distribution channels, or
vertical integration.  In such cases, trade liberalization may do little to increase market access.  
Put differently, the process of implementing trade policy reform in markets where existing
protection is high may be likened to peeling an onion.  As you peel off the first layer of protection
at the border, such as lowering a tariff, you may expect to find a new layer of protection revealed,
such as a local government restriction.  And on the process goes, revealing new layers of
protection, perhaps not previously known until some deregulation took place.  These observations
have been made at length in the case of Japan, and have been striking in the recent experience of
Indonesian trade reform.  In the context of either CUSTA or NAFTA these matters explain some
of the reasons why actual implementation may be less significant than the results initially expected
of the reduced border protection in these trade agreements.
One general impression left by the CUSTA is that there is indeed many a slip between the
"cup" of signing a trade agreement and the "lip" of implementation.  The early results from this
agreement, although incomplete at this time, provide a few added illustrations of the
implementation difficulties discussed above.  There are many state and provincial regulations to
contend with, particularly in the fruit and vegetable sector.  Marketing orders in the U.S., health
and safety inspections in California, and provincial marketing boards in Canada are examples. 
Another example is found in efforts to harmonize technical barriers between Canada and the U.S. 
Although scientific questions may be showing progress in some areas, harmonization efforts have
been sporadic.  As an illustration of the exercise of local market power, there have been
allegations about the difficulties in gaining access to U.S. wholesale (distribution) channels, as
well as to retail shelf space.  At least this suggests there are economies of size in gaining access to
these markets.
To conclude, general experience and that of the CUSTA suggest that implementation of
new trade provisions can be expected to be uneven.  Institutional factors at the state or local level
described above may reduce trade flows from levels that would be expected from a casual
observation of the wording of the agreements or from economic models that ignore such
imperfect "transmission" of liberal intentions.   Given this fact, NAFTA trade negotiations and
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policy analysts in all three countries would do well to give more attention to these institutional
factors to ensure the trade agreement is more effective in liberalizing trade and to anticipate more
accurately the results of any new agreement.
VIII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1.  The Agricultural Issues in a NAFTA
In any agreement on freer trade among Mexico, Canada, and the U.S., agriculture will
play a key role, while presenting serious difficulties to the negotiators.  In addition to thetraditional issue of removing trade barriers it will include attention to those domestic policies that
distort trade, and larger issues such as environment, health, and safety standards, and
employment.  It will be affected on many fronts by the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.  At
the same time, the real effect of a NAFTA will be obscured by a variety of important ongoing
matters, such as domestic policy reform, changing technologies and comparative advantage,
changes in demand and market trends, macroeconomic conditions, and changing environmental
policies.
The sectoral interests perceived in each country within agriculture are well-focused.  In
the U.S. and Canada, there are concerns expressed by the fruit and vegetable sector about
Mexican competition, and more favorable expectations of new market opportunities in grains,
oilseeds, and livestock.  In Mexico, there are fears of losses in cereals, gains in fruits and
vegetables, and a major concern with the farm labor implications of any trade policy changes. 
These sectoral interests will be explored in more detail below for three sectors, grains and
oilseeds, fruit and vegetables, and food processing.
The major trade impediments likely to be addressed in negotiations aimed at easing access
into the three markets will be the following.  The main import barriers will be tariffs, particularly
seasonal fruit and vegetable tariffs in the U.S. and Canada, import licensing arrangements in
Mexico, and U.S. marketing orders, mostly affecting fresh fruits and vegetables.  On health,
safety and environmental standards, the issues are likely to be enforcement of standards,
eliminating the uncertainties of border testing, according national treatment to all imports, and the
recognition that different environmental and worker safety laws can exist.  Finally, on limiting the
negative effects on trade of domestic price support policies, the negotiations likely will probe
the variety of technical mechanisms for ensuring this end, such as moving to tariffs and decoupling
support payments, rather than attempting a more ambitious coordination of domestic policies.
2. Grains and Oilseeds
The Mexican grains and oilseeds sector will be potentially affected by a NAFTA more
than that of any other agricultural sector.  This is due to (a) the high levels of protection precently
in place for Mexican corn and other cereals, (b) the large number of small farms which dominate
Mexican cereal production, (c) the low levels of income among these farmers and within their
rural areas, and (d) the significant social implications, including migration flows, which would
arise from large changes in cereals policy and prices.  Offsetting the difficulties accompanying
cereals deregulation would be lower food prices for the urban population, opportunities for
modernizing investments in infrastructure, cereals, and the livestock sectors, and an expansion of
production in the latter.  To complicate these predictions further, a reform of land tenure laws and
the ejido system could induce enough increased investment and productivity to alter substantially
the anticipated effects of a NAFTA.
The experience of an attempted deregulation of the Mexican sorghum market in 1989
gives an illustration of the potential difficulties in reforming trade policy in the context of other
government regulations and a high cost infrastructural environment.  The attempt to remove all
trade restrictions on sorghum was short-lived because it became increasingly clear that farm pricesand incomes would have fallen significantly in the short run without intervention, below their
likely long run levels.  This would have occurred due to a combination of (a) high cost or poorly
developed storage facilities and transportation services, (b) the fact that, with sorghum production
being very localized, livestock producers in other regions could import U.S. sorghum more
cheaply, and (c) that cheap government credit was available to finance these imports.  It should be
expected that these potential problems will constrain Mexico's negotiating stance on cereals in
NAFTA discussions.
3. Fruits and Vegetables
In this sector the primary issue is the access of Mexican produce to the U.S. market. 
However, underlying this specific concern with market access are the issues of environment,
health, food safety, and quality restrictions.  Pesticide and phytosanitary regulations provide the
clearest example of the importance of health and food safety issues, while U.S. marketing order
legislation illustrates the problem with quality restrictions.  
The variation in pesticide regulations is a natural result of differences across countries (and
sometimes provinces, states, or regions) in pesticide standards, regulations, enforcement measures
and capabilities, climatic conditions, production practices, and assessments of the underlying risks
involved.  Bearing in mind only the differences in climate and the resulting crops grown and
production practices, harmonizing pesticide regulations will be extremely difficult.  Progress in
these areas of technical standards has been slow in the CUSTA where country differences were
much smaller to begin with.  Improvements in implementing trade policy may be all that can be
anticipated.  These would include a move away from border inspections toward mutually accepted
testing procedures, and toward a more consistent application of "national treatment."  The same
general comments apply to phytosanitary regulations, where again there is a thin line between
legitimate protection and protectionism.
U.S. marketing orders (quality restrictions based upon size, maturity and grade) restrict
access to produce entering the fresh market.  Although U.S. produce from other regions is not
affected by these restrictions, imported produce is. The quality standards change from year to
year, and this uncertainty imposes heavy costs on Mexican exporters.  Therefore, despite the
appearance of following the principle of national treatment, these provisions are widely
considered to be another non-tariff barrier.  The easiest solution will be to allow foreign products,
identified by country of origin, to gain exclusion from the orders.  A more difficult but longer run
solution would be to recognize the "non-tariff barrier" nature of this provision and phase it out.
4. Food Processing
This important component of the food chain in the U.S. and Canada often receives tariff
protection, that, under a NAFTA, is likely to be lost.  Hence, the fears expressed are like those
heard from parts of the manufacturing sector:  due to lower wage rates and environmental
standards, Mexican food firms will expand at the expense of their competitors in Canada and the
U.S.  Such claims may reflect more public posturing than accurate predictions for a variety of
reasons.  First, those food firms losing protections have a range of strategies available to respond
to competitive challenges, such as reducing units costs through changed production practices,
technologies or the mix of labour and capital.  Possibly more important, they can make marketing
changes such as moving to food products where they have a greater advantage or investing in a
high quality reputation through brand names or labels.  Second, many of these same pressures are
already being felt, resulting in ongoing trends to increase productivity, relocate production
facilities or change marketing strategies.  In other words, many of the challenges attributed to a
NAFTA are occurring or will occur anyway.  Third, the prospect of large increased supplies of
farm products in Mexico at current prices may not be likely.  There will be increased demands for
fresh products within Mexico.  Further, increased production to satisfy greater demands by
processors may be more costly due to competition for land, irrigation water, and infrastructure. 
The effect and importance of each of these factors is difficult to predict in advance.  Hence one
can be advised to put little weight on most of the predictions of economic ruin due to a NAFTA
heard in the U.S. or Canada.
5. Linkages between NAFTA, the GATT, and CUSTA
With domestic policies being reformed in many countries and the negotiation of both the
current GATT round and a variety of regional trade pacts, there are many simultaneous efforts to
place fewer restrictions on international trade.  Many of the same issues are being addressed,
particularly the distorting impact on trade flows of policy instruments designed for domestic farm
price support.  This is the case in recent Latin American initiatives, and among the countries of
Easter Europe moving from centrally planned to market economies.  In many cases, tariffs are
replacing quantitative restrictions, and there is some reduction in the dispersion and levels of tariff
rates.  
The importance of the GATT on these related fronts cannot be understated.  In some ways
a GATT agreement is complementary to regional trade agreements, in that many of the regional
problems will be reduced if a GATT accord deals with them.  But in many ways, the regional
agreements cannot replace a new GATT accord, notably in removing the major distortions which
are now imposed on a variety of world markets.
The Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement is relevant to a NAFTA because it now offers three
years of experience in terms of both design and implementation of a regional accord.  Although it
may be less relevant in that a low priority was given to agriculture, a number of common issues
remain:  snapback tariff provisions, the banning of export subsidies on each other among partners,
the experience of Technical Working Groups, the innovative use of levels of support in the two
countries as a trigger for removing import licenses, and the importance of maintaining consistency
with existing GATT articles and with possible GATT changes.  In terms of implementation, it is
instructive that the results have been very uneven.  One problem is that federal governments
negotiated the agreement, yet provinces or states have significant control on day-to-day
commerce.  Another problem is that new forms of protection are likely to emerge in those
industries with a high degree of existing protection.  The lesson, of broader relevance than for aNAFTA, is that the actual implementation of trade liberalizing measures may well yield results of
less open trade than initially expected.
6. Overall Conclusions
Four general conclusions arise from this review.  First, although the effect on North
American agriculture overall will be limited, there will be important local effects.  For example,
the Mexican grains and oilseeds sector and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. fruit and vegetable sector,
are those most affected.  The effects of such an agreement will be much greater on Mexican
agriculture than on agriculture in Canada and the U.S.  The long run effects of such an agreement
may be more significant due to gradual improvements in comparative advantage, and the greater
income and spending growth in Mexico.  None of the substantial dislocations in agriculture in the
U.S. and Canada predicted from time to time are likely to arise from a NAFTA.  
Second, ongoing changes and developments in world markets, technologies of production,
macroeconomic environments, and trade and domestic policy reforms elsewhere are likely to be
more significant to North American agriculture than a NAFTA.  
Third, there are many contentious and difficult areas where an agreement should be
expected to be modest.  These areas include environmental standards, health and safety standards,
and dispute settlement mechanisms.  
Finally, the Uruguay Round of the GATT is very important for determining the scope and
extent of a NAFTA in the area of agriculture.  With no GATT agreement, major policy distortions
of world markets cannot be addressed, and the promise of greater sales to Japan and the E.C. may
reduce the enthusiasm for export subsidy reductions and tariffication.REFERENCES
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